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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for trafficking in weapons
56 results foundAuthor: Violence Policy Center Title: Indicted: Types of Firearms and Methods of Gun Trafficking from the United States to Mexico as Revealed in U.S. Court Documents Summary: Increasing public attention is focusing on the role of the U.S. civilian firearms markets as a major source of guns supplied to the Mexican drug cartels responsible for the escalating violence on the U.S.-Mexico border. Aided by restrictions - endorsed by the National Rifle Association and implemented by Congress - on the release of federal crime gun trace data and a longstanding lack of detained information on gun commerce (both legal and illegal) in America, the gun lobby has claimed that Mexican drug lords are solely using true military weapons, not their civilian counterparts, and that such guns do not come from the U.S. civilian firearms market. This report, based on indictments and criminal information filed in U.S. district courts in the southwest United States, refutes the gun lobby's claims. The information contained in these government documents demonstrates - by the make, model, caliber, manufacturer, and retail source of firearms seized in criminal trafficking cases - that the military-style semiautomatic firearms easily available on the U.S. civilian gun market are a significant component of the weapons being trafficked to, and utilized by, the Mexican cartels. Details: Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2009. 23p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 116304 Keywords: Gun ViolenceIllegal GunsMexican Drug CartelsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Dreyfus, Pablo Title: Small Arms in Brazil: Production, Trade, and Holdings Summary: It is not difficult to find evidence of Brazil’s high levels of armed violence. The proof is in the grim statistics of the country’s hospitals, morgues, and prisons. This Special Report looks at two aspects of this problem. First, it explores the thriving Brazilian small arms industry, which, together with international trafficking networks, contributes to control failures and fuels small arms violence. Second, it maps out weapons holdings—by weapon type, holder, and location Details: Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2010. 170p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2010 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR11-Small-Arms-in-Brazil.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Brazil URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR11-Small-Arms-in-Brazil.pdf Shelf Number: 120035 Keywords: GunsIllegal TradeTrafficking in WeaponsViolenceViolent Crime |
Author: Seniora, Jihan Title: Managing Land Borders and the Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons Summary: Border controls are an important dimension of the international efforts to combat the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition. Indeed, even if their relevance sometimes seems to be challenged by some changes (such as new technologies and globalization), borders remain the most visible sign of the sovereignty of a State on its territory. Borders management are crucial to a State’s involvement in the protection of its population. The illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) across green borders is characterized by specific dynamics which must be taken into account in the actions to prevent it: a strong link between cross-border trafficking of SALW and other transnational crimes, the role of transborder communities and the fact that border areas can become a shelter for criminal groups, rebels or traffickers and finally the “ant trade”. Because these aspects have an impact on the demand in arms, the intensity and the direction of the traffics between neighbouring countries, they deserve particular attention in the efforts to strengthen border monitoring and control at checkpoints. For an effective border management several challenges must be highlighted. First, the flow of illicit SALW must be considered a separate issue when conceiving and organising the management. Second, controls at checkpoints must be optimised by clarifying the role of the agencies involved in border management and their human and technical needs according to realities on the ground. Controls at checkpoints must be reinforced by a careful and coordinated monitoring along the border. Measures also need to be taken upstream: national legislations, identification of the actors involved in trafficking by intelligence services, etc. A fourth issue is corruption which affects the very existence of border management. A stronger cooperation between agencies at intra- and inter-level as well as between populations in border areas and the political and administrative authorities can also contribute to a more effective border management. Finally, technology transfers and training, tailored to the needs of each State also prove of great importance. Details: Brussels: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la securite (GRIP), 2010. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2010 at: http://www.grip.org/en/siteweb/images/RAPPORTS/2010/2010-3_EN.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.grip.org/en/siteweb/images/RAPPORTS/2010/2010-3_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 120011 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Porobic, Jasmin Title: Arms Availability and its Impact on Drug Trafficking: A Balkan Perspective Summary: Large scale weapons stockpiling during contemporary Balkan wars left behind massive quantities of arms and other military equipment. The reaction of the international community to the outbreak of the wars was to establish an arms embargo, which had little effect, as the republics turned to the international black marketers and in a world-wide arms trading within organized crime groups from all over the world. Moreover, after the conflicts, disarmament processes were not efficient, leaving most of the arms beyond effective government control. Arms trafficking was closely tied with organized crime activities for their great profitability and existed in areas of armed conflict and where organized groups needed arms for own protection or violent activities. This environment led to the development of smuggling channels and reinforced the organized crime groups. Initially, channels were used to smuggle arms but also other scarce goods which led to strengthening of organized crime groups’ cooperation in fostering the black market. The conflicts (1991-1999) in the Former Yugoslavia provided ample opportunities for arms and drugs trafficking in unprecedented proportions. Unlike opposing legal structures, organized crime groups in the Balkans are multiethnic, transnational and well-integrated within its corresponding European criminal counterparts. Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Kosovar, Montenegrin and Serbian criminal groups work not only together but also with drug manufacturers from Asia and South America and European distributors. Today, Albania is among the leading countries in the world in processing opium, with widespread organized criminal groups in all former Yugoslav republics and throughout the world. During the conflicts, more often than not, proceeds from drug trafficking and distribution were used to buy the weaponry to arm certain belligerent groups. Recent police actions to combat organized criminal groups in virtually all cases indicate that arms smuggling is consistently linked to drugs trafficking. The police reports show that every police operation stepping up the fight against organized crime seizes large quantities of both drugs and arms as it goes ‘hand in hand’. Attempts of illegal cross-border trafficking of drugs and arms have been a common occurrence. Despite permanent police operations aimed at suppressing organized criminal activity this phenomenon is on the rise. For example, among numerous actions – within the scope of the region-wide police operation dubbed Network 2010, large quantities of narcotics and arms were seized at the Klobuk border crossing near Trebinje between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Some 155 kilograms of a potent strain of cannabis, ‘skunk’, and 276 rifles were found in a hidden compartment of a truck after a months-long, carefully planned operation. However, the fight against these types of organized crime activities is difficult in this region given the high rate of corruption and links between organized crime groups and high state officials. This policy paper therefore provides a general overview of trends and circumstances surrounding the most resilient sectors of organized crime – illicit drugs and arms – and comparatively assesses the efforts of governments in the Western Balkans in containing them. It further offers possible remedial solutions to the problem. An analysis of domestic and international academic literature, appropriate legislation and security agency materials, as well as deductive, comparative and descriptive were utilized in preparation of the policy paper. Data were gathered by using interrogative method and individual interviews of narrowed-down population of officials from various police agencies, judicial and customs institutions involved in small arms control and organized-crime investigative matters. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief Series, No. 13: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/179_Policy_Brief_13_-_Arms_availability_and_its_impact_on_drug_trafficking._A_Balkan_perspective.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/179_Policy_Brief_13_-_Arms_availability_and_its_impact_on_drug_trafficking._A_Balkan_perspective.pdf Shelf Number: 120163 Keywords: Drug TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General. Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of ATF's Project Gunrunner Summary: This review by the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) examined the impact of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) implementation of Project Gunrunner on the illicit trafficking of guns from the United States to Mexico. Violence associated with organized crime and drug trafficking in Mexico is widespread, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths. In part because Mexican law severely restricts gun ownership, drug traffickers have turned to the United States as a primary source of weapons, and these drug traffickers routinely smuggle guns from the United States into Mexico. The criminal organizations responsible for smuggling guns to Mexico are typically also involved in other criminal enterprises, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and cash smuggling. This requires ATF to work with other federal entities, as well as with state and local law enforcement partners, in sharing intelligence, coordinating law enforcement activities, and building cases that can be prosecuted. To help combat firearms trafficking into Mexico, ATF began Project Gunrunner as a pilot project in Laredo, Texas, in 2005 and expanded it as a national initiative in 2006. Project Gunrunner is also part of the Department’s broader Southwest Border Initiative, which seeks to reduce cross-border drug and firearms trafficking and the high level of violence associated with these activities on both sides of the border. In June 2007, ATF published a strategy document, Southwest Border Initiative: Project Gunrunner (Gunrunner strategy), outlining four key components to Project Gunrunner: the expansion of gun tracing in Mexico, international coordination, domestic activities, and intelligence. In implementing Project Gunrunner, ATF has focused resources in its four Southwest border field divisions. In addition, ATF has made firearms trafficking to Mexico a top ATF priority nationwide. The OIG conducted this review to evaluate the effectiveness of ATF’s implementation of Project Gunrunner. Our review examined ATF’s enforcement and regulatory programs related to the Southwest border and Mexico, ATF’s effectiveness in developing and sharing firearms trafficking intelligence and information, the number and prosecutorial outcomes of ATF’s Project Gunrunner investigations, ATF’s coordination with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement partners, ATF’s traces of Mexican “crime guns,” and challenges that ATF faces in coordinating efforts to combat firearms trafficking with Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2010. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2010 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf Shelf Number: 120279 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGun ViolenceGunsOrganized CrimeTrafficking in WeaponsWeapons |
Author: Leslie, Glaister Title: Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica Summary: Jamaica’s murder rate—62 per 100,000 in 2009— is one of the highest in the world. The small island grapples with violent crime within a context of gangs, guns, and allegations of political and police corruption. This report presents an overview of the history, prevalence, and distribution of gangs, focusing in particular on their involvement in international drug and arms trafficking and the possible influence of deportees from the United States. It finds that there is a dense social web connecting highly organized, transnational gangs to loosely organized gangs whose activities are often indistinguishable from broader community violence. Persistent facilitation of gang activity by politicians continues to hinder targeted violence reduction efforts, despite the government’s public condemnation of crime and violence, and official support of violence reduction. The report’s findings include: There are around 268 active gangs operating throughout the island, five times the number estimated in 1998; Gangs are accused of being responsible for as much as 80 per cent of all major crimes in Jamaica; Over the past decade, murders committed in Jamaica have almost doubled, and gun-related murders have driven the increase; Most firearms seized in Jamaica are traced back to three counties in the US state of Florida, all of which have large Jamaican populations. Most small arms used in crimes are believed to have entered the country illegally, but much of the ammunition appears to have entered the country legally before being transferred to illicit markets. The discovery in early 2010 of large amounts of illegal ammunition and firearms — all originating from the police force’s central armoury—has conclusively linked security forces to the distribution of ammunition and weapons to criminals. Reductions in Jamaica’s violence will be short-lived unless the linkages between politicians, organized crime, and gangs are severely eroded. Community policing may offer an important alternative to security forces’ more repressive approaches to crime control. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2010. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper no. 26: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP26-Jamaica-gangs.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Jamaica URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP26-Jamaica-gangs.pdf Shelf Number: 120297 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGang ViolenceGangs (Jamaica)Illegal TradeTrafficking in WeaponsViolent Crime |
Author: Xiu, Liu Title: Organized Crime and the Black Economy in China Summary: Organized crime has now become a serious social problem in all cities in China. Officially, the Chinese government has thus far acknowledged that only a few criminal groups have acquired so-called mafia-like characteristics in their organizational structure. However, there are no real mafia-type organizations in China. Organized crime in China mainly engages in drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling, human trafficking, manufacture and smuggling of counterfeit money and guns, prostitution, etc. Details: Santiago, Chile: Global Consortium on Security Transformation, 2010. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series, No. 7: Accessed November 29, 2010 at: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/173_Working_Paper_7_-_Organized_Crime_and_the_Black_Economy_in_China.pdf Year: 2010 Country: China URL: http://www.securitytransformation.org/images/publicaciones/173_Working_Paper_7_-_Organized_Crime_and_the_Black_Economy_in_China.pdf Shelf Number: 120299 Keywords: Drug TraffickingHuman TraffickingMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (China)ProstitutionSmugglingTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy Title: US/Mexico Bi-National Cooperation Against Illicit Drugs: Main Results and Performance Measures of Effectiveness Summary: This document contains two reports. The first one entitled Main Results of the U.S.–Mexico Bi-national Cooperation Against Illicit Drugs (1995–2000), approved at the VIII HLCG meeting held in Mexico City in August 8th 2000 and second, the Performance Measures of Effectiveness Report. The Performance Measures of Effectiveness Report describes accomplishments by the United States and Mexico in the first eighteen months (February 1998–August 1999) in which the US/Mexico Bi-National Drug Control Strategy was in effect. It is an attempt to review the status of the Action Items contributing to the achievement of the Strategy goals that were detailed within the initial PME publication. The Main Results of the Bi-national Cooperation Against Illicit Drugs is an effort to provide a general assessment and a more current account of our cooperation efforts. The purpose of the two documents is to provide information to policy makers so that they can evaluate what parts of the bi-national strategy have been achievable, what parts need more effort, and what parts ought to be changed. The two reports will permit the reader to evaluate whether we have completed our actions, and how those actions contribute to achieving the Strategy objectives. Details: Washington, DC: Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2010. 182p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2010 at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/international/binational_1995_to_2000/binational_1995_to_2000.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/international/binational_1995_to_2000/binational_1995_to_2000.pdf Shelf Number: 120494 Keywords: Drug Control PolicyDrug EnforcementIllegal DrugsIllegal FirearmsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Feinstein, Dianne Title: Halting U.S. Firearms Trafficking to Mexico: A Report ....to the United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, One-Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session Summary: Military-style weapons are arming Mexico's brutal drug trafficking organizations at an alarming rate. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has consistently found that the overwhelming majority of firearms recovered at crime scenes and traced by Mexican officials originate in the United States. These guns have contributed to Mexico's dangerous levels of violence. Since the start of the administration of President Felipe Calderon in December 2006, according to Mexican government estimates, 34,612 people have died in organized crime-related killings in Mexico. The killings reached their highest level in 2010, increasing by almost 60 percent to 15,273 deaths from 9,616 the previous year. As the U.S. partners with Mexico to combat drug-related violence, we must enhance our efforts to curb firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. This report provides background information on firearms trafficking and makes recommendations to Congress and the Obama Administration on key next steps. Details: Washington, DC: The Authors: 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=143589&coll=limited Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=143589&coll=limited Shelf Number: 121828 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun Control (U.S.)Gun ViolenceOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Diaz, Tom Title: The Militarization of the U.S. Civilian Firearms Market Summary: This study identifies the major force driving the criminal cross-border gun traffic: the gun industry’s cynical militarization of the U.S. civilian gun market. “Today, militarized weapons--semiautomatic assault rifles, 50 caliber anti-armor sniper rifles, and armor-piercing handguns--define the U.S. civilian gun market and are far and away the ‘weapons of choice’ of the traffickers supplying violent drug organizations in Mexico” the study, "The Militarization of the U.S. Civilian Firearms Market" finds. The study also finds that the gun industry has become so dependent on militarized product lines that 11 of the top 15 gun manufacturers now market assault weapons, adding that “...the gun industry designs, manufactures, imports, and sells firearms in the civilian market that are to all intents and purposes the same as military arms. It then bombards its target market with the message that civilian consumers--just like real soldiers--can easily and legally own the firepower of militarized weapons.” The study documents a deliberate gun industry design and marketing strategy, begun in the 1980s, that has resulted in the easy availability and shockingly weak regulation of guns that are — •Identical to sophisticated battlefield weapons used by the armed forces of the United States and other countries, such as the Barrett 50 caliber anti-armor sniper rifle. •Slightly modified variants of military firearms that would otherwise be illegal to sell on the civilian market, including semiautomatic versions of military assault weapons, such as civilian AR-15 and AK-47 assault rifle models. •Weapons capable of defeating body armor, specially designed for police and counter-terrorism units, such as the FN Herstal Five-seveN 5.7mm pistol. “Your grandfather’s shotgun has no place in today’s civilian gun market,” said the study’s author, VPC Senior Policy Analyst Tom Diaz. “The gun industry has created a unique American civilian firearms bazaar which arms thousands of criminals, dangerous extremists, and drug traffickers throughout the world. If Congress wants to find the real causes of the gun traffic to Mexico, it needs to look upstream to the gun industry’s callous transformation of the American gun market into one more suited to warfare than sport. The world’s bad guys come here for their guns because they are cheap and plentiful.” The study describes how, plagued by declining gun ownership and the explosion of recreational alternatives such as electronic games, the faltering gun industry has relied on creating demand by designing and selling increasingly lethal military-style firepower. Details: Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2011. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 27, 2011 at: http://www.vpc.org/studies/militarization.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.vpc.org/studies/militarization.pdf Shelf Number: 121832 Keywords: Gun ControlGun Violence (U.S.)GunsTrafficking in WeaponsWeapons |
Author: Seelke, Clare Ribando Title: U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond Summary: Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security and governance in Mexico. According to Mexican government data, organized crime-related violence claimed more than 34,500 lives in Mexico between January 2007 and December 2010. That toll may now exceed 40,000. Escalating violence has increased U.S. concerns about stability in Mexico, a key political and economic ally, and about the possibility of violence spilling over into the United States. Mexican drug trafficking organizations dominate the U.S. illicit drug market and are now considered the greatest organized crime threat facing the United States. In recent years, U.S.-Mexican security cooperation has increased significantly, largely as a result of the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative, a counterdrug and anticrime assistance package for Mexico and Central America that was first proposed in October 2007. Between FY2008 and FY2010, Congress provided $1.5 billion for Mérida Initiative programs in Mexico, with an early emphasis on training and equipping Mexican security forces engaged in counterdrug efforts. As part of the Mérida Initiative, the Mexican government pledged to intensify its efforts against transnational criminal organizations and the U.S. government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. With funding for the original Mérida Initiative technically ending in FY2010 and new initiatives underway for Central America and the Caribbean, the Obama Administration worked with the Mexican government to develop a new four-pillar strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. That strategy, adopted in March 2010, focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities. The first two pillars largely build upon existing efforts, whereas pillars three and four broaden the scope of Mérida programs to include efforts to facilitate “secure flows” through the U.S.-Mexico border and to improve conditions in violence-prone border cities. Congress appropriated $143.0 million in Mérida assistance for Mexico for FY2011 in P.L. 112-10. The Administration requested $282 million in Mérida assistance for FY2012. As of August 1, 2011, a total of $473.8 million worth of assistance had been provided to Mexico. The 112th Congress is likely to continue funding and overseeing the Mérida Initiative, as well as examining the degree to which the U.S. and Mexican governments are fulfilling their pledges to tackle domestic problems contributing to drug trafficking and crime in the region. Congress may also examine the degree to which the Administration’s new strategy for the Mérida Initiative complements other counterdrug and border security efforts as outlined in the 2011 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy. Given current budget constraints, Congress may also debate how best to measure the impact of current and future Mérida Initiative programs. Another congressional interest is likely to focus on whether human rights conditions placed on Mérida Initiative funding are appropriate or sufficient. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2011. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: R41349: Accessed September 7, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf Shelf Number: 122670 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug ControlDrug Trafficking (Mexico)Merida InitiativeOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Knight, Brian G. Title: State Gun Policy and Cross-State Externalities: Evidence from Crime Gun Tracing Summary: This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of cross-state externalities associated with gun regulations in the context of the gun trafficking market. Using gun tracing data, which identify the source state for crime guns recovered in destination states, we find that firearms in this market tend to flow from states with weak gun laws to states with strict gun laws, satisfying a necessary condition for the existence of cross-state externalities in the theoretical model. We also find an important role for transportation costs in this market, with gun flows more significant between nearby states; this finding suggests that externalities are spatial in nature. Finally, we present evidence that criminal possession of guns is higher in states exposed to weak gun laws in nearby states. Details: Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: NBER Working Paper Series; Working Paper 17469: Accessed October 3, 2011 at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17469 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17469 Shelf Number: 122964 Keywords: Gun ControlGun TraffickingGuns (U.S.)Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Minority Staff, Committee on Oversight Title: Fatally Flawed: Five Years of Gunwalking in Arizona Summary: On December 15, 2010, Customs and Border Protection Agent Brian Terry was killed in a gunfight in Arizona, and two AK-47 variant assault rifles found at the scene were traced back to purchases by one of the targets of an investigation called Operation Fast and Furious being conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). The target already had been identified as a suspected straw purchaser involved with a large network of firearms traffickers smuggling guns to deadly Mexican drug cartels. At the request of the Committee’s Ranking Member, Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, this report describes the results of the Committee’s year-long investigation into the actions and circumstances that led to this operation. The report finds that gunwalking operations originated as early as 2006 as agents in the Phoenix Field Division of ATF devised a strategy to forgo arrests against low-level straw purchasers while they attempted to build bigger cases against higher-level trafficking organizers and financiers. Rather than halting operations after flaws became evident, they launched several similarly reckless operations over the course of several years, also with tragic results. Each investigation involved various incarnations of the same activity: agents were contemporaneously aware of illegal firearms purchases, they did not typically interdict weapons or arrest straw purchasers, and firearms ended up in the hands of criminals on both sides of the border. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Minority Staff, 2012. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 14, 2012 at: http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/minority_report_13112.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/minority_report_13112.pdf Shelf Number: 124129 Keywords: Assault WeaponsGun Violence (Arizona)Illegal FirearmsTrafficking in GunsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Violence Policy Center Title: Iron River: Gun Violence and Illegal Firearms Trafficking on the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: Mexico is under siege, its democratic governance is at risk. This report examines the role of the U.S. civilian gun market in the drug-related violence in Mexico that is creeping northward into the United States. Part One provides an overview of the conflict and its links with the United States. These links include the “drug war,” the U.S. civilian firearms market, and transnational street gangs involved in drug and firearms trafficking. Part Two outlines in more detail the role of the U.S. civilian gun market in fueling the war in Mexico. It focuses on weak regulation and the deliberate introduction of military-style firearms that today define the civilian market. Part Three suggests ways to control the firearms traffic. It emphasizes “upstream” measures to inhibit the movement of firearms from legal commerce into illegal trade, as opposed to only law enforcement efforts, which are aimed “downstream” and focus on apprehending and prosecuting smugglers after the damage is done. Some steps can be taken immediately by strong presidential leadership without the need for new legislation. Others require legislation or rule-making procedures. Details: Washington, DC: Violence Policy Center, 2009. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 9, 2012 at: http://www.vpc.org/studies/ironriver.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.vpc.org/studies/ironriver.pdf Shelf Number: 116390 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun Trafficking (U.S., Mexico)Gun ViolenceTrafficking in WeaponsViolent Crime |
Author: Pierce, Glenn Title: New Approaches to Understanding and Regulating Primary and Secondary Illegal Firearms Summary: The major objective of this study is to enhance understanding of the characteristics and regulation of primary and secondary illegal firearms markets. The study has two major components: 1) a national study of illegal firearm markets based on ATF firearm trace data for all firearms recovered by law enforcement between 2003 and 2006, and 2) a California focused study based ATF traced firearms recovered in California between 2003 and 2006 that were crossed referenced with California Dealer Record of Sale (DROS) data to yield information on the last-known purchaser of a firearm. The national study was designed to: - Develop an enhanced understanding of illegal firearms markets using ATF trace data - Assess the potential impact of State firearm laws on firearms trafficking using ATF trace data The California analysis was designed to: • Enhance the tactical and strategic value of firearms trace data by tracing crime-related guns to last-known dealers/purchasers - Improve our overall understanding of illegal secondary markets The national study found that the stringency of state level firearms laws and regulations on time-to-crime and, in the case of California, the regular enforcement of state regulations lead to consistently longer time-to-crime for firearms recovered within their jurisdictions. These patterns persist for whether firearms were purchased within the recovery jurisdiction or in another state. With the addition, of other potential indicators of time-to-crime into the analysis, the effect of firearm laws is mediated in a manner that conforms to the expectations of how firearms regulations can operate to control the illegal distribution guns. Specifically, when dealer related variables are entered into the overall model of time-to-crime the effects of states with more stringent laws and regulations are reduced more than states without such laws, as would be expected given that state firearms laws and regulations should work through their regulation on dealers. In addition, a number of other potential determinants of time-to-crime have effects on time-to-crime that indicate they are potentially useful indicators of illegal firearms trafficking. The California analysis compared illegal firearm market characteristics using information from ATF trace data (based primarily on first-time, retail-sourced information) with illegal firearms market characteristics based on ATF trace data updated with California DROS information. This comparison revealed that including information on the last known purchaser of 2 a firearm significantly reduced the median time-to-crime of California-sourced crime guns relative to time-to-crime calculations based on standard ATF trace data. This finding indicates that guns sometimes move very rapidly from subsequent market transactions to use in crime. These finding suggest that enhanced firearm trace data can be very useful in guiding law enforcement actions against gun traffickers and criminals directly acquiring firearms through secondary market sources. Details: Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2013. 177p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 13, 2013 at: New Approaches to Understanding and Regulating Primary and Secondary Illegal Firearms Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 127610 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun ViolenceIllegal Firearms Markets (U.S.)Illegal GunsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Gerney, Arkadi Title: Lost and Stolen Guns from Gun Dealers Summary: Every year tens of thousands of guns are discovered to be missing from the inventories of federally licensed gun dealers. Guns that go missing from dealer inventories, whether they are stolen, illegally sold without proper documentation, or misplaced due to negligent recordkeeping, pose two main risks to public safety: 1. Guns stolen from dealers often end up in criminal hands. Following a two-year study of gun-trafficking investigations, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, or ATF, reported that 14 percent of gun-trafficking investigations involved guns stolen from gun dealers. 2. Guns lost or stolen from dealers are more difficult to trace because there is no record of who initially purchased the gun from the dealer. When these guns are used in crimes, any investigative lead offered by finding the gun at the crime scene goes cold when it is discovered that the gun dealer has no record of who purchased it. Since 2004 Congress has imposed restrictions on ATF in its annual budget that make it especially difficult for the agency to police lost and stolen guns. One such restriction prevents ATF from requiring gun dealers to conduct an annual inventory, a process that would allow dealers to promptly identify and report missing guns. In the administration’s fiscal year 2014 budget request to Congress, however, President Barack Obama requested for the first time that Congress remove this harmful budget rider. This issue brief presents the aggregated data on guns that are lost and stolen from dealers each year, discusses example cases of how guns missing from particular dealers have put the public at risk, and explains how Congress has hindered law-enforcement efforts to prevent and investigate thefts from gun dealers. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2013. 10p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2013 at: http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/GerneyInventoryBrief-1.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/GerneyInventoryBrief-1.pdf Shelf Number: 129241 Keywords: Gun DealersGun-Related ViolenceGuns (U.S.)Stolen PropertyTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Krouse, William J. Title: Gun Control Proposals in the 113th Congress: Universal Background Checks, Gun Trafficking, and Military Style Firearms Summary: Congress has debated the efficacy and constitutionality of federal regulation of firearms and ammunition, with strong advocates arguing for and against greater gun control. The mass shooting in Newtown, CT, along with other mass shootings in Aurora, CO, and Tucson, AZ, has restarted the national gun control debate. Members of the 113th Congress could consider a range of legislative proposals, including several that President Barack Obama has announced his support for as part of his national gun violence reduction plan. The most salient of the President’s legislative proposals would (1) require background checks for intrastate firearms transfers between unlicensed persons at gun shows and nearly any other venue, otherwise known as the “universal background checks” proposal; (2) increase penalties for gun trafficking; and (3) reinstate and strengthen an expired federal ban on detachable ammunition magazines of over 10- round capacity and certain “military style” firearms commonly described as “semiautomatic assault weapons,” which are designed to accept such magazines. On March 21, 2013, Senator Harry Reid introduced the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 (S. 649). As introduced, this bill included the language of several bills previously reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Those bills included the Stop Illegal Trafficking in Firearms Act of 2013 (S. 54), the Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013 (S. 374), and the School Safety Enhancements Act of 2013 (S. 146). However, the Assault Weapons Ban of 2013 (S. 150) was not included in S. 649. From April 17-18, 2013, the Senate considered S. 649 and nine amendments that addressed a wide array of gun control issues, ranging from universal background checks to assault weapons. By unanimous consent, the Senate agreed that adoption of these amendments would require a 60-vote threshold. All but two of these amendments were rejected. However, a final vote was not taken on S. 649. This report provides an overview of federal firearms law and examines these gun control proposals and related amendments. While the House has not considered any of the gun control proposals debated in the Senate, on May 8, 2013, the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs approved a bill, the Veterans 2nd Amendment Protection Act (H.R. 602), that addresses veterans, mental incompetency, and firearms eligibility. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: R42987: Accessed July 8, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42987.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42987.pdf Shelf Number: 129270 Keywords: Gun Control (U.S.)Gun TraffickingGun ViolenceTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Alemika, Etannibi E.O. Title: The Impact of Organised Crime on Governance in West Africa Summary: There are several types of organised criminal activities and operatives in West Africa. These activities include drug trafficking, advanced fee and internet fraud, human trafficking, diamond smuggling, forgery, cigarette smuggling, money-laundering, arms manufacture, arms trafficking, and armed robbery as well as oil bunkering . Transnational organised criminal activities often involve collaboration among domestic and foreign criminal groups. Organised criminal groups infiltrate governments, businesses, political and economic systems. They undermine the effectiveness of these systems, sometimes through corruption and violence. It is imperative that enough effort is given to the understanding of the impact of organised crime on governance in West Africa. Aim and scope of study In this study, the following issues are addressed: - Variety and trends of organised crime in West Africa; - Impact of organised crime on peace, stability, development and the rule of law; - Transnational linkages of organised crime; and - Linkages between state institutions/politics and organised crime. The focus of the study is different from the prevalent approach to the subject and reports on organised crime in West Africa, which have been more concerned with drug trafficking, human trafficking and scams directed at European and North American countries. Inadequate attention has been paid to other forms of organised crime. More significantly, there has been a lack of attention to the impact of organized crime on the fragile political, economic and social systems of the region. The responses by international, regional and national actors involved in developing and implementing measures against organised crime emphasise developing the capacity of law enforcement and judicial officials to enable effective interdiction and enforce the law. However, experience over the past two decades in many parts of the world indicates that reliance on law enforcement alone may not be an effective and sustainable enough approach. A broader understanding of actors, modes of operation, networks, of the nexus between organised crime and political systems, and the impact of organised criminal activities and actors on the economies and societies of West African countries is a prerequisite for developing a comprehensive and effective response to the activities of criminal networks. Details: Abuji, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Regional Office Abuja, 2013. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10199.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/10199.pdf Shelf Number: 133292 Keywords: Criminal NetworksDrug TraffickingHuman traffickingMoney LaunderingOrganized Crime (West Africa)SmugglingTobacco SmugglingTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Paudel, Lekh Nath Title: The Highway Routes: Small Arms Smuggling in Eastern Nepal Summary: The Highway Routes: Small Arms Smuggling in Eastern Nepal, a new Issue Brief from the Small Arms Survey's Nepal Armed Violence Assessment project, examines various dimensions of the illicit trade in small arms in eastern Nepal, based on fieldwork conducted between December 2013 and April 2014, including over 100 interviews with representatives of law enforcement and the underworld. The Issue Brief analyses the sources of illicit small arms, the methods of smuggling and routes used, illicit trade and related activities, and the consumers and other actors involved, as well as relevant government policies. Its major findings include: ##Most firearms circulating in eastern Nepal are trafficked via the open border with India rather than the more heavily regulated frontier with China. They transit through towns and cities in the border areas to the main destinations of Kathmandu, Dharan, and Chitwan. - The trafficking of small arms in Nepal is predominantly an 'ant trade', carried out by individuals or loosely organized groups. ##Criminal elements increasingly prefer to rent rather than own illicit firearms because it reduces the likelihood of arrest. - The illicit traffic in small firearms is dominated by craft (country-made) and counterfeit guns. ##Government and police efforts to curb the trafficking of small arms and ammunition have included a range of legal and policy responses, with mixed results. 'Buy-and-bust' sting operations have succeeded in arresting and disbanding a number of smuggling rings, although some maintain that it is generally the carriers who are arrested rather than the main organizers. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/NAVA-IB4-Highway-Routes.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nepal URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/NAVA-IB4-Highway-Routes.pdf Shelf Number: 134165 Keywords: Illicit TradeIllicit Trafficking (Nepal)Organized CrimeSmugglingTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: European Commission. Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services Title: Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the European Union Summary: The purpose of the study was to: - Analyse the current legal framework in all Member States including the definitions of specific offences relating to firearms trafficking, the sanctions, the liability of legal and natural persons and the notions of intent, negligence and aggravating or mitigating circumstances; - Analyse the implementation of the above-mentioned offences in practice and identify possible obstacles in police and judicial cooperation due to the existence of different legal systems; - Make recommendations as to the advisability of the approximation of certain offences and sanctions and suggest specific provisions if appropriate. The purpose of this study was to provide DG Home with information required for the Impact Assessment to determine the most appropriate policy option within the context of possible changes to the 2008 Directive. The research involved desk research to examine legal frameworks and other information, a survey of key stakeholders, an interview programme, and three workshops covering the Benelux countries, Baltic States and the Western Balkans, Austria and Hungary, which were attended by representatives from a total of 11 Member States. 2. Main Conclusions The study's main findings and conclusions are summarised below under three sub-headings - the problem of illicit firearms trafficking, existing legal frameworks to combat illicit arms trafficking, and policy objectives and evaluation of policy options. 2.1 The problem of illicit firearms trafficking Overall, the research confirms that Europe faces a serious illicit firearms trafficking problem. This is a problem in its own right but also as an important factor contributing to other criminal activities such as drugs smuggling and human trafficking as well as terrorist-related activities that threaten the security of EU Member States and their citizens. Trafficked firearms also contributes to increased lethality of criminal violence by adding to firearms availability. The nature and scale of illicit firearms trafficking in the EU is difficult to assess given the hidden nature of the problem. Two approaches could be used - a broad indicator based on the number of unregistered firearms and a narrower measure based on firearms seizures - but they give widely differing estimates (there are 67 million unregistered firearms in the EU or 79% of the 81 million total licit and illicit firearms; seizures are estimated to account for around 1% or 81,000 of the total). The first of these approaches is likely to be very much an overestimate of the quantity of illicit firearms whilst the second calculation is almost certainly an underestimate. Informed estimates by national enforcement authorities or other institutions using various other methodologies are illuminating but also unreliable. The conclusion is that the illicit firearms trafficking cannot be estimated precisely and only quantified in terms of a broad range. Notwithstanding the methodological complications in measuring the phenomenon, most of the literature suggests however that illicit arms trafficking takes place on a considerable scale. In many respects, the scale of the illicit firearms trafficking problem is usefully measured by the number of firearms-related homicides. It is estimated that illicit firearms trafficking has been directly responsible for at least 10,000 firearms-related deaths in EU Member States over the past decade. Some other estimates (e.g. by the UNODC) put the deaths at a higher level than this (around 1,200 p.a.). Availability of firearms during violent incidents tends to substantially increase the lethality of injuries. In addition to murders committed by individuals, illegally-held firearms are often used by organised crime groups to coerce and to intimidate their victims. Moreover, the use of illicit firearms in organised crime activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution, and money laundering leads to further deaths (e.g. from drugs use). Terrorists and extremists have also used illicit firearms to carry out attacks. Overall, the use of firearms is a significant destabilising factor in European societies. In terms of the drivers of illicit firearms trafficking, three main types of players can be identified on the demand and supply sides of the problem. On the demand-side, the illicit firearms end users of most concern are criminal or terrorist individuals and groups that procure firearms illegally to use in the pursuit of their goals. Secondly, traffickers and other intermediaries are involved in the actual trafficking of firearms either for profit or other reasons (e.g. being linked to a criminal conspiracy). Lastly, on the supply-side, suppliers are individuals and organisations that provide a source of illicit firearms (either intentionally or unintentionally) who are again likely to be motivated by financial considerations, at least where the act of supplying illicit weapons is intentional. The main sources of illegal weapons in the EU are the reactivation of neutralised weapons, burglaries and thefts, embezzlement of legal arms, legal arms diverted to the illegal market, firearms retired from service by army or police, and the conversion of gas pistols. Most illicit firearms originate from cross-border trafficking, often from outside the EU. Since the early 1990s, the firearms illicitly trafficked have originated from three main sources that have replaced each other: first of all the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact bloc were a source of illicit firearms due to the fall of the iron curtain; then, during the wars of Yugoslav succession, the Western Balkans became an important source of illicit firearms; and more recently, North Africa has superseded the former, with a pool of weapons available and following some of the main drug trafficking routes into the EU. According to Europol, the amount of heavy firearms and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in circulation in the EU seems to satisfy much of the demand at present and suppliers in south-eastern Europe have the capacity to meet any rise in demand in the foreseeable future. There is already extensive cross-border cooperation between EU Member States and their law enforcement agencies to combat illicit firearms trafficking. Whilst there are many examples of successful operations to intercept weapons before they can be used, there are also cases where police and/or judicial cooperation has been made more difficult because of differences in legal frameworks in different countries. There are also significant complications of tackling cross-border illicit firearms trafficking of a non-legal nature. 2.2 Existing legal frameworks to combat illicit arms trafficking At present, there are significant differences with regard to EU Member States' legal frameworks for combatting illicit firearms trafficking. This applies to the definition of offences, the types and levels of penalties applicable to legal and natural persons, the treatment of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and the factor of negligence and degrees of intent. International and EU legal frameworks that have a bearing on illicit firearms trafficking are broadly defined and leave signatories with considerable discretion on how key provisions are implemented. Example provisions on the criminalisation of illicit firearms trafficking are included in the UNODC's Model Law. However, the Model Law itself has no binding force on EU Member States. What is more, to leave a 'margin of discretion' for national legislators to implement the instruments in the most appropriate manner in line with their legal traditions, neither the Model Law clauses nor the other international or EU instruments are prescriptive as regards the various legal elements of an illicit firearms trafficking offence. Similarly, the relevant provisions of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Firearms Protocol to the UN Convention on Organised Crime also leave considerable scope for discretion on these matters. As a result of the different legal histories and cultures and the non-prescriptive approach at international/EU level, there is a diversity of legal frameworks in relation to illicit firearms trafficking at the national level. Differences exist with regard to the definition of offences, penalties and sanctions, the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances and the possibility of a negligent illicit firearms trafficking offence. Other important issues where there are differences relate to the ways in which firearms trafficking offences are prosecuted (as mere possession in some instances) and seizure in transit (and tracing issues). However, divergences in national legislation are not per se a rationale for EU intervention. The relevant issue is whether, pursuant to Article 83(1) TFEU, there is a need to establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of illicit firearms trafficking with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of this offence or from a special need to combat such trafficking on a common EU basis. Minimum, EU-wide rules on illicit firearms trafficking would have the benefit of reducing legal uncertainty produced by these divergences for national police and investigating authorities, facilitate prosecutions, ensure that criminals are unable to exploit loopholes, and reduce incentives for criminals forum shop between EU jurisdictions. The research indicates that divergences do indeed affect cross-border police and judicial cooperation - and that, given the intrinsically cross-border nature of illicit firearms trafficking, there is a strong need to combat the offence on an EU-wide basis. However, the evidence also suggests that practical issues such as lack of resources, conflicting policy priorities (for example with anti-terror legislation) and lack of enforcement of existing laws are equally significant impediments to cross-border efforts to combat illicit firearms trafficking than differences in national legislation in this area. Feedback from the research indicates that cooperation between the police and other law enforcement agencies on cross-border cases is generally good, if often cumbersome and dependent on the quality of networks of contacts. However, at the judicial stage, e.g. in seeking permission for controlled deliveries or asking for a prosecutor to take up a case following an investigation, these differences in legal frameworks can cause complications. In considering any EU initiative, however, it should be acknowledged that there are likely to be political sensitivities in approximating some elements of the illicit firearms trafficking offence given that questions of aggravating or mitigating circumstance, sanctions and penalties, and the factor of negligence and degrees of intent touch on fundamental principles of criminal law at the national level. 2.3 Policy Objectives and Evaluation of Policy Options The overall policy objectives of any new EU-level initiative should be to help Member States to combat illicit firearms trafficking more effectively and by doing so, enhancing the common area of freedom, security and justice. More specific goals include deterring criminal offences related to firearms, improving cooperation between law enforcement authorities in preventing detecting, disrupting, investigating and prosecuting illicit arm trafficking; and providing a model which can be promoted in discussions with third countries on firearms risk reduction. Operational goals are defined as being to minimize the differences in definitions of firearms offences and levels of sanctions across the EU; to put in place a system for regular monitoring the effectiveness of efforts to disrupt firearms crime, and to further encourage the sharing of information and intelligence. Several Policy Options have been defined and assessed in the report. To summarize: - Policy Option 1: Status Quo - continuation of the current situation with no new EU intervention. - Policy Option 2(a): Non-legislative action - promoting closer collaboration between Member States rather than introducing new EU-level initiatives (although these may be necessary to promote close collaboration). This option would include non-statutory intervention, either as a first step or supporting action for implementing EU legislation in the future. - Policy Option 2(b): Minimum legislative intervention at the EU level - a minimum level of legislative intervention at EU level to strengthen cross-border cooperation between law enforcement agencies by making certain types of cooperation obligatory. - Policy Option 3: Comprehensive legislative solution at EU level - EU action to introduce legally-binding common minimum standards across Member States with regard the definition of criminal offences and their sanctions related to illicit arms trafficking and linked offences. - Policy Option 4 - Combination of legislative and non-legislative actions, i.e. Policy Options 2 and 3. In essence, Policy Option 1 entails a continuation of the status quo as defined in the problem assessment (this could mean a potential worsening of the problem caused by illicit firearms trafficking) with the 'advantageous effects' of Policy Options 2 and 3 being measured against this baseline. Because it is difficult to quantify what impact different Policy Options might have on the current level of illicit firearms trafficking, the assessment of the merits and drawbacks of different Policy Options is essentially qualitative. Drawing on the results of the analysis of expected financial and economic, social and other impacts, including the implications for fundamental rights, the conclusion is that Policy Option 4 (i.e. a combination of Policy Options 2 and 3) will have the most advantageous effect on the problem and on promoting EU policy aims. Policy Option 4 is therefore the recommended option. Details: Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014. 204p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2015 at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/general/docs/dg_home_-_illicit_fireams_trafficking_final_en.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/general/docs/dg_home_-_illicit_fireams_trafficking_final_en.pdf Shelf Number: 136351 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: UNODC Study on Firearms: 2015. A study on the transnational nature of and routes and modus operandi used in trafficking in firearms Summary: The Study was developed to raise global knowledge on illicit trafficking in firearms, including its transnational nature and the routes and modus operandi used, by enhancing understanding of this phenomenon and its links to other serious crimes. The Study is the first of its kind and all Member States were invited "to participate in and contribute to it as appropriate" (para. 7, Conference resolution 6/2). It lays the foundation for further research at the international level on trafficking in firearms. One of the primary objectives was to demonstrate the importance of data collection and analysis on trafficking in firearms and, consequently, highlight the usefulness of monitoring illicit firearms trafficking flows at the national, regional and international levels. This Study demonstrates the importance of continuing efforts to enhance national systems for collection and analysis of detailed data on illicit firearms trafficking. It is a demonstration of the potential future value of improved national systems to collect data and international cooperation in collating and analysing that data. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2015. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/UNODC_Study_on_Firearms_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/UNODC_Study_on_Firearms_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 136359 Keywords: Organized CrimeTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: University of West Indies. Institute of International Relations Title: Private Security Companies in the Caribbean: Case Studies of St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica Summary: The origin of this field research project on private security companies (PSCs) in the Caribbean came from a discussion at a workshop jointly hosted by the Institute of International Relations at The University of the West Indies (IIR UWI) and Project Ploughshares (PP) on 20-21 January 2010 at the St. Augustine campus in Trinidad and Tobago. The workshop brought together officials from 14 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member and associate states to advance a regional response to the mounting threats and damage caused by illicit firearms in the Caribbean. Many of the workshop participants were senior police officers from the subregion. They were joined by representatives of Caribbean civil society organizations and regional organizations that included the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), as well as the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). Discussion at this workshop pointed to the effects of illicit gun trafficking and use-as well as some possible solutions-that could be brought into sharper focus by examining the prominent role of PSCs in the Caribbean. PSCs provide security for industries, resorts, and even governments. As such, PSCs often are a first line of observation and response to criminal activities, but can also be a means by which guns move from licit to illicit markets or use. This project contributes to the still limited published information on PSCs in the Caribbean by creating case studies on the private security industry in St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica. The research was designed to describe and analyze PSCs in each country, as well as current national laws and regulations related to the industry. The case study data provide a clearer picture of the roles and functions of PSCs, which can be used by government regulators and the industry itself to raise standards of performance, encourage appropriate policy development, and generally improve the security situation for citizens. The case studies also provide a better understanding of how PSCs fit into the CARICOM security architecture. Details: St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago: Institute of International Relations, The University of the West Indies, 2013. 162p. Source: Internet Resource: Project Ploughshares: Accessed August 10, 2015 at: http://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Priv_Security_Co_Carribean.webFINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Caribbean URL: http://ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Priv_Security_Co_Carribean.webFINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 136376 Keywords: Illegal MarketsIllicit MarketsPrivate Security IndustryTrafficking in GunsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Boggs, Clay Title: Gun-Running Nation: How Foreign-Made Assault Weapons are Trafficked from the United States to Mexico and What to Do About It Summary: A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF FIREARMS THAT ARE RECOVERED IN MEXICO COME FROM THE UNITED STATES, BUT ARE NOT U.S.-MANUFACTURED; THEY ARE FIRST IMPORTED, PRINCIPALLY FROM ROMANIA. Data from the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) show that about 25 percent of U.S.-sourced firearms traced in Mexico were first imported into the United States, and the number could perhaps even be higher. A database of illegal firearms trafficking indictments from U.S. court records compiled by the Violence Policy Center indicates that between 2008 and 2014 the majority of Latin America-bound guns seized by U.S. authorities during the trafficking process-59 percent-were imports. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS A GREAT DEAL OF LATITUDE IN ITS ABILITY TO RESTRICT THE IMPORTATION OF ASSAULT WEAPONS. The president has the authority, granted in the Gun Control Act of 1968, to restrict the importation of firearms that are not "particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting purposes." This authority has been used by previous presidents from both parties to restrict the importation of semiautomatic assault rifles. The president has the authority to ban the semiautomatic assault rifles that are currently being imported legally and then trafficked illegally to Mexico. CROSS-BORDER FIREARMS TRAFFICKING FROM THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES AT SIGNIFICANT LEVELS. It is widely known that the majority of firearms recovered by authorities in Mexico and submitted to ATF for tracing are U.S.-sourced. Between 2009 and 2014, 104,850 firearms were recovered in Mexico and submitted to ATF for tracing; 70 percent (73,684) of those firearms were determined by ATF to be U.S.-sourced. Trace data are also now available for several countries in Central America and the Caribbean: 40 percent of the 8,157 firearms submitted to ATF for tracing in Central America in 2014 were U.S.-sourced. In that year, 60 percent of the 1,387 firearms submitted to ATF in five Caribbean countries came from the United States. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America and Violence Policy Center, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 21, 2015 at: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Gun_Running_Nation.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Gun_Running_Nation.pdf Shelf Number: 136512 Keywords: FirearmsGun TraffickingTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Title: Developing a Mechanism to Prevent Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Scope and Implications Summary: During the past decade, the problems posed by unregulated arms brokering activities have become an issue of growing concern for governments, international organizations and civil society in the context of international efforts against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. An important body of research has brought the role of arms brokers in facilitating arms transfers to unlawful or illegitimate recipients to the fore of the political agenda. Despite their central role in the arms business, the activities of arms brokers are often unregulated. Arms brokers who facilitate unlawful arms transfers are aiding and abetting violators of arms embargoes, armed groups, criminal gangs and terrorists, thus fuelling insecurity and conflict in many regions of the world. A number of regional organizations such as the African Union, the Andean Community, the Economic Community of West African States, the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Southern African Development Community, as well as the states parties to the Wassenaar Arrangement and the states of the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, have developed instruments and standards for the regulation of brokering activities that the respective member states are encouraged or required to adopt. Such instruments could form the basis of a global effort to curb illicit arms brokering. Partly as an effect of these regional agreements, about 40 countries throughout the world have developed specific controls on brokering activities. In the majority of national legislations, however, brokering activities remain unregulated. In addition, loopholes and inconsistencies in existing systems of control continue to be exploited by unscrupulous brokers. Following the Secretary-General's consultations with all Member States and interested regional and subregional organizations, and recognizing the need for concerted global action, in 2005 the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 60/81 establishing a group of governmental experts to consider further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons. This study, conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA), examines existing instruments at the national and international levels. It aims to identify common elements and options for regulation, to enhance understanding of the issue and to clarify its most complex aspects. Details: Geneva, SWIT: UNIDIR, 2006. 219p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed August 24, 2015 at: http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ChaptersBrokeringNov06.fm_.pdf Year: 2006 Country: International URL: http://ipisresearch.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ChaptersBrokeringNov06.fm_.pdf Shelf Number: 136568 Keywords: Illegal Arms TransfersIllegal TradeOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Derghougassian, Khatchik Title: Illicit Associations in the Global Political Economy: Courtesan Politics, Arms Trafficking and International Security Summary: The accelerated trend of globalization has transformed the traditional role of the state. According to James Mittelman and Robert Johnston, the state is engaged in a courtesan role, which consists in shifting from serving citizens to acting as tacit partners in market relations, including with globally organized criminal groups. Building on the concept of the courtesan role of the state, this study addresses: (a) the general question of direct and indirect connections of states with illicit transactions in the post-Cold War, with a special attention to arms trafficking; (b) the reaction of the United States, as the remaining unique superpower, to the behavior of states associated with global illicit transactions, especially when involving security-sensitive cases such as arms transfer; (c) the security implications of this particular feature of the global illicit economy, particularly how threats are defined in international politics in the post-Cold War unipolar world. Focusing on the Argentina venta de armas case of illicit arms transfer to the Balkans and Ecuador in the 1990s, the research explores (a) the structural conditions and the domestic roots of a state engaged in illegal transactions in the post-Cold War; (b) the superpower's reaction to policies involving illicit transactions; (c) the security consequences. Through these venues, the dissertation aims at refining the debate in IR Theory to provide a better understanding of the international security dynamics in the post-Cold War. Details: Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami, 2010. 584p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1466&context=oa_dissertations Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1466&context=oa_dissertations Shelf Number: 136618 Keywords: Illegal TradeOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain Summary: Violent crimes committed by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico often involve firearms, and a 2009 GAO report found that many of these firearms originated in the United States. ATF and ICE have sought to stem firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. GAO was asked to undertake a follow-up review to its 2009 report (GAO-09-709) addressing these issues. This report examines, among other things, (1) the origin of firearms seized in Mexico that have been traced by ATF, (2) the extent to which collaboration among U.S. agencies combating firearms trafficking has improved, and (3) the extent to which the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy measures progress by U.S. agencies to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed program information and firearms tracing data from 2009 to 2014, and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States take steps to formally monitor implementation of the 2009 MOU between ATF and ICE. GAO also recommends that ONDCP establish comprehensive indicators that more accurately reflect progress made in efforts to stem arms trafficking to Mexico. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and ONDCP agreed with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-223: Accessed January 12, 2016 at: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 137468 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingHomeland SecurityTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Building Partner Capacity: U.S. Agencies Can Improve Monitoring of Counter-Firearms Trafficking Efforts in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico Summary: Trafficking of illicit materials, including firearms, is widespread across Mexico's more than 700-mile southern border with Guatemala and Belize. Such trafficking presents a challenge for law enforcement in all three countries and for U.S. security interests. State and other U.S. agencies, such as ATF, have provided support to build the capacity of their counterparts in these three countries to address problems related to firearms trafficking. GAO was asked to review U.S. support to the governments of Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico to stem firearms trafficking across their shared border. This report examines, for these three countries, (1) the activities undertaken by U.S. agencies to build partner capacity to combat firearms trafficking and the extent to which they considered key factors in selecting the activities and (2) progress the United States has made in building such capacity. GAO analyzed program documentation and conducted interviews with U.S., Belizean, Guatemalan, and Mexican officials. To examine progress, GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of eight key activities based on a number of factors, including whether the activity addressed firearms trafficking. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that (1) ATF establish and document performance targets for its key counter-firearms trafficking activities in Belize, Guatemala, and Mexico, as appropriate, and (2) State work with other U.S. agencies and implementers to help ensure that progress reports identify key challenges and plans to address them. ATF and State agreed with these recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-235: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674640.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Central America URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/674640.pdf Shelf Number: 137754 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingPartnershipsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Title: A Review of the Department of Justice's and ATF's Implementation of Recommendations Contained in the OIG's Report on Operations Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver Summary: In September 2012, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued a 471-page report that described the findings of our review of two Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) firearms trafficking investigations, one code named "Operation Fast and Furious" and the other "Operation Wide Receiver." Our review identified serious management flaws in both investigations and we made six recommendations to address the deficiencies we found. We requested that the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) examine ATF's law enforcement policies to ensure that they comply with the Department's guidelines and policies, and evaluate the sufficiency of ATF's case review procedures for matters that present heightened risk to the public or agents. We also believed that ATF should institute training; we requested the Department work with ATF to develop guidance on how agents should investigate gun trafficking organizations. The remainder of our recommendations were focused on the Department itself or its law enforcement components other than ATF. We requested that the Department evaluate the policies of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) to ensure that they are sufficient to address the concerns we identified from the conduct of Operations Fast and Furious and Wide Receiver. We also recommended that the Department more carefully scrutinize wiretap applications and regularly convene a working group of leaders from the Department's law enforcement components to ensure appropriate coordination among them. In its initial written response to the report, the Department stated that it agreed with our recommendations and committed to implementing them. In this follow-up review we evaluated the Departments efforts to implement our recommendations. We determined that four of the six recommendations can be closed. The two remaining recommendations have been resolved, but additional work needs to be completed in order for them to be closed. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Oversight & Review Division 16-01: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/o1601.pdf#page=1 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 137964 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingGun traffickingOperation Fast and FuriousOperation Wide ReceiverTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Schroeder, Matt Title: Dribs and Drabs: The Mechanics of Small Arms Trafficking Summary: There are over 550 million firearms in worldwide circulation. That's one firearm for every 12 people on the planet. The only question is: How do we arm the other 11? (Lord of War, 2005) This iconic line from the 2005 film Lord of War conveys widely held assumptions about international arms traffickers: that they are ambitious, well-connected, globe-trotting entrepreneurs who single-handedly arm criminals and militias throughout the world. The film's fictional protagonist, Yuri Orlov, is based on five actual arms dealers, including Russian businessman Viktor Bout, whose vast global network of shell companies and unsavoury clients earned him the moniker 'the Merchant of Death' (Gilchrist, 2005). The composite image of Bout and his peers has become the archetypal arms trafficker, the image that comes to mind whenever the illicit arms trade is discussed. Yet most arms traffickers bear little resemblance to that image. The 'merchants of death' do indeed fuel conflicts and stock the arsenals of dictators, but there is little evidence to suggest that they dominate the illicit arms trade. Most arms trafficking is less flashy, less centralized, and even more difficult to stop. The following Issue Brief analyses this side of the illicit small arms trade, which receives far less attention than the multi-ton shipments arranged by rogue brokers. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2016. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Issue Brief: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-IB17-Mechanics-of-trafficking.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-IB17-Mechanics-of-trafficking.pdf Shelf Number: 138305 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingIllegal tradeIllicit TradeSmuggling of WeaponsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence Title: Healing Communities in Crisis: Lifesaving Solutions to the Urban Gun Violence Epidemic Summary: Healing Communities in Crisis outlines two categories of solutions: intervention programs and policy reforms. These approaches are grounded in the insight that, in most communities, an incredibly small and identifiable population is responsible for the vast majority of gun violence. Our report highlights the following programs: - Group Violence Intervention (GVI)- In this approach to gun violence prevention, a partnership of law enforcement, community members, and service providers is assembled to meet with small groups of the most at-risk individuals in order to send a message that the shooting must stop. The program has now been replicated in a wide array of American cities, with consistently impressive results. - Cure Violence (CV) - This promising strategy treats violence like a communicable disease. The spread of violence is interrupted by employing Outreach Workers and Violence Interrupters to work directly with individuals most likely to commit or become the victims of gun violence. A community campaign is also conducted to change norms surrounding the use of violence. - Hospital-Based Violence Intervention Programs (HVIP) - Victims of violent injury are very likely to end up back in the hospital. This model takes advantage of a unique teachable moment by connecting violently injured youths with culturally competent case managers who are able to shepherd their clients to badly-needed social services that enable change. Our report also lays out the policy reforms most likely to decrease the supply of crime guns in impacted communities. These policies include: universal background checks, permit to purchase laws, gun trafficking regulations, and prohibitions on large capacity ammunition magazines. Details: San Francisco: Law Center to Prevention Gun Violence, 2016. 91p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2016 at: http://smartgunlaws.org/healing-communities/ Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://smartgunlaws.org/healing-communities/ Shelf Number: 139019 Keywords: Gun PolicyGun TraffickingGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesTrafficking in WeaponsViolence Prevention |
Author: Akkerman, Mark Title: Border Wars: The Arms Dealers Profiting from Europe's Refugee Tragedy Summary: The refugee crisis facing Europe has caused consternation in the corridors of power, and heated debate on Europe's streets. It has exposed fundamental faultlines in the whole European project, as governments fail to agree on even limited sharing of refugees and instead blame each other. Far-right parties have surged in popularity exploiting austerity-impacted communities in putting the blame for economic recession on a convenient scapegoat as opposed to the powerful banking sector. This has been most potently seen in the UK, where leaders of the 'Leave EU' campaign unscrupulously amplified fears of mass migration to successfully mobilise support for Brexit. Refugees fleeing terrible violence and hardship have been caught in the crossfire; forced to take ever more dangerous routes to get to Europe and facing racist attacks in host nations when they finally arrive. However there is one group of interests that have only benefited from the refugee crisis, and in particular from the European Union's investment in 'securing' its borders. They are the military and security companies that provide the equipment to border guards, the surveillance technology to monitor frontiers, and the IT infrastructure to track population movements. This report turns a spotlight on those border security profiteers, examining who they are and the services they provide, how they both influence and benefit from European policies and what funding they receive from taxpayers. The report shows that far from being passive beneficiaries of EU largesse, these corporations are actively encouraging a growing securitisation of Europe's borders, and willing to provide ever more draconian technologies to do this. Most perverse of all, it shows that some of the beneficiaries of border security contracts are some of the biggest arms sellers to the Middle-East and North-African region, fuelling the conflicts that are the cause of many of the refugees. In other words, the companies creating the crisis are then profiting from it. Moreover they have been abetted by European states who have granted the licences to export arms and have then granted them border security contracts to deal with the consequences. Their actions are also in the framework of an increasingly militarised response to the refugee crisis by the European Union. Under the banner of 'fighting illegal immigration', the European Commission plans to transform its border security agency Frontex into a more powerful European Border and Coast Guard Agency. This would have control over member states border security efforts and a more active role as a border guard itself, including purchasing its own equipment. The agency is backed up by EUROSUR, an EU system connecting member and third states' border security surveillance and monitoring systems. Militarisation of border security is also demonstrated by the military objectives of the 'European Union Naval Force - Mediterranean Operation Sophia' (EUNAVFOR MED) as well as the use of military on many borders, including Hungary, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. NATO naval missions in the Mediterranean are already actively assisting EU border security. Meanwhile, countries outside the EU are being pushed to take up a role as outpost border guards to try to stop refugees from reaching the EU borders. The recent EU migration deals with Turkey, which have been severely criticised by human rights organisations, deny refugees access to Europe and have resulted in more violence against them. The report shows that: The border security market is booming. Estimated at some 15 billion euros in 2015, it is predicted to rise to over 29 billion euros annually in 2022 The arms business, in particular sales to the Middle-East and North-Africa, where most of the refugees are fleeing from, is also booming. Global arms exports to the Middle-East actually increased by 61 per cent between 2006-10 and 2011-15. Between 2005 and 2014, EU member states granted arms exports licences to the Middle East and North Africa worth over 82 billion euros The European policy response to refugees which has focused on targeting traffickers and strengthening its external borders (including in countries outside the European Union) has led to big budget increases which benefits industry Total EU funding for member state border security measures through its main funding programmes is 4.5 billion euros between 2004 and 2020 Frontex, its main border control agency's budget increased 3,688% between 2005 and 2016 (from $6.3m to $238.7m) EU new member states have been required to strengthen borders as a condition of membership, creating additional markets for profit. Equipment purchased or upgraded with External Borders Fund money includes 54 border surveillance systems, 22,347 items of operating equipment for border surveillance and 212,881 items of operating equipment for border checks Some of the arms sales permits to the Middle-East and North Africa are also intended for border control. In 2015, for example the Dutch government granted a 34 million euro export license to Thales Nederland for the delivery of radar and C3-systems to Egypt despite reports of human right violations in the country The European border security industry is dominated by major arms companies, who have all set up or expanded security divisions as well as a number of smaller IT and specialist security firms. Italian arms giant Finmeccanica identified "border control and security systems" as one of the primary drivers for increase in orders and revenues The big players in Europe's border security complex include arms companies Airbus, Finmeccanica, Thales and Safran, as well as technology giant Indra. Finmeccanica and Airbus have been particularly prominent winners of EU contracts aimed at strengthening borders. Airbus is also the number one winner of EU security research funding contracts Finmecannica, Thales and Airbus, prominent players in the EU security business are also three of the top four European arms traders, all active selling to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Their total revenues in 2015 amounted to 95 billion euros Israeli companies are the only non-European receivers of research funding (thanks to a 1996 agreement between Israel and the EU) and also have played a role in fortifying the borders of Bulgaria and Hungary, and promote their expertise based on the West Bank separation wall and the Gaza border with Egypt. Israeli firm BTec Electronic Security Systems, selected by Frontex to participate in its April 2014 workshop on 'Border Surveillance Sensors and Platforms', boasted in its application mail that its "technologies, solutions and products are installed on [the] Israeli-Palestinian border" The arms and security industry helps shape European border security policy through lobbying, through its regular interactions with EU's border institutions and through its shaping of research policy. The European Organisation for Security (EOS), which includes Thales, Finmecannica and Airbus has been most active in lobbying for increased border security. Many of its proposals, such as its push to set up a cross European border security agency have eventually ended up as policy - see for example the transformation of Frontex into the European Border and Coastguard Agency (EBCG). Moreover Frontex/EBCG's biannual industry days and its participation in special security roundtables and specialist arms and security fairs ensure regular communication and a natural affinity for cooperation. The arms and security industry has successfully captured the 316 million euros funding provided for research in security issues, setting the agenda for research, carrying it out, and then often benefiting from the subsequent contracts that result. Since 2002, the EU has funded 56 projects in the field of border security and border control. Collectively the evidence shows a growing convergence of interests between Europe's political leaders seeking to militarise the borders and its major defence and security contractors who provide the services. But this is not just an issue of conflicts of interest or of profiteering from crisis, it is also about the direction Europe takes at this critical moment. More than a half century ago, then US President Eisenhower warned of the dangers of a military-industrial complex, whose power could "endanger our liberties or democratic processes". Today we have an even more powerful military-security-industrial complex, using technologies that point outwards and inwards, that right now are targeted at some of the most vulnerable desperate people on our planet. Allowing this complex to escape unexamined poses a threat to democracy and to a Europe built on an ideal of cooperation and peace. As Eisenhower put it: "Down the long lane of the history yet to be written... this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2016. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2016 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/border-wars-report-web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/border-wars-report-web.pdf Shelf Number: 139605 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityImmigrantsImmigrationRefugeesTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Matfess, Hilary, ed. Title: Beyond Convergence: World Without Order Summary: The world order built upon the Peace of Westphalia is faltering. State fragility or failure are endemic, with no fewer than one-third of the states in the United Nations earning a "high warning" -- or worse -- in the Fragile States Index, and an equal number suffering a decline in sustainability over the past decade. State weakness invites a range of illicit actors, including international terrorists, globally networked insurgents, and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The presence and operations of these entities keep states weak and incapable of effective governance, and limit the possibility of fruitful partnerships with the United States and its allies. Illicit organizations and their networks fuel corruption, eroding state legitimacy among the governed, and sowing doubt that the state is a genuine guardian of the public interest. These networks can penetrate the state, leading to state capture, and even criminal sovereignty. A growing number of weak and corrupt states is creating gaping holes in the global rule-based system of states that we depend on for our security and prosperity. Indeed, the chapters of this book suggest the emergence of a highly adaptive and parasitic alternative ecosystem, based on criminal commerce and extreme violence, with little regard for what we commonly conceive of as the public interest or the public good. The last 10 years have seen unprecedented growth in interactivity between and among a wide range of illicit networks, as well as the emergence of hybrid organizations that use methods characteristic of both terrorist and criminal groups. In a convergence of interests, terrorist organizations collaborate with cartels, and trafficking organizations collude with insurgents. International terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, engage energetically in transnational crime to raise funds for their operations. Prominent criminal organizations like Los Zetas in Mexico and D-Company in Pakistan have adopted the symbolic violence of terrorists—the propaganda of the deed—to secure their “turf.” And networked insurgents, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), have adopted the techniques of both crime and terror. An Emerging Criminal Ecosystem The unimpeded trajectory of these trends -- convergence, hybridization, and state capture -- poses substantial risks to the national security interests of the United States, and threatens international security. Illicit networked organizations are challenging the fundamental principles of sovereignty that undergird the international system. Fragile and failing states are both prey to such organizations, which feed on them like parasites, and Petri dishes for them, incapable of supporting effective security partnerships. The Westphalian, rule-based system of sovereign polities itself is at risk of fraying, as fewer and fewer capable states survive to meet these challenges, and populations around the world lose faith in the Westphalian paradigm. The emergence of an alternative ecosystem of crime and violence threatens us all and much of the progress we have seen in recent centuries. This dark underworld weakens national sovereignty and erodes international partnerships. We should not take for granted the long-term durability of the Westphalian system. It was preceded by millennia of much less benign forms of governance, and alternative futures are imaginable. This book describes "convergence" (the interactivity and hybridization of diverse illicit networks), the emergence of new networks and new domains or "battlespaces," and the threat illicit networks pose to national and international security. It examines dystopian visions of a world in which these trajectories go indefinitely unimpeded, and concludes by discussing possible countermeasures to be explored. While some recognize the growing threat to the global system of governance that these new phenomena impose, others are skeptical. According to the conventional wisdom, TCOs and international terrorist organizations are unlikely candidates for partnership. Such analysis suggests that criminals are motivated by the pursuit of wealth in defiance of law, morality, or ideology. They typically prefer to remain undetected, and have little interest in the violence committed by, or risks taken by, international terrorists. Already pursued by law enforcement, criminals are not keen to receive the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency or SEAL Team Six. International terrorists and insurgents, on the other hand, are politically motivated; driven by ideological, religious, or nationalistic motives; and repelled by the vulgar materialism and greed of criminals. They have no desire to get on the radar of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or other national or international law enforcement agencies. This logic is understandable, and may have prevailed in previous times, but the evidence of extensive interconnectivity -- if not explicit partnership -- between TCOs, international terrorists, and globally networked insurgents is compelling. Recent research undertaken by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point reveals that, "criminals and terrorists are largely subsumed (98 percent) in a single network as opposed to operating in numerous smaller networks."4 In its Performance Budget Congressional Submission for FY 2014, the DEA stated that by "the end of the first quarter of FY 2013, 25 of the 67 organizations on the Attorney Generals Consolidated Priority Organization Target (CPOT) List are associated with terrorist organizations." According to a more recent DEA statement, roughly half of the Department of State's 59 officially designated foreign terrorist organizations have been linked to the global drug trade. The six degrees of separation that may have once divided people is a relic of the past—today, international terrorists, insurgents, and criminals are merely a click away from each other. It might be argued that terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime have existed since time immemorial, and that their modern iterations represent nothing new. Such an argument naively discounts modern enablers such as information and communication technology, transportation advances, and the unprecedented volumes of money generated in illicit markets. These are game changers. They permit illicit actors to avail themselves of lethal technology, military-grade weaponry, real-time information, and professional services of the highest quality, including legal, accounting, technological, security, and paramilitary services. Cartels and gangs, as well as terrorists and some insurgents, can now out-man, outspend, and outgun the governments of the countries where they reside. They can communicate across the globe in real time, using widely available and inexpensive technology. The November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attackers used satellite phones, internet communications, and global positioning systems, under the direction of Pakistan-based handlers to carry out an atrocious binge of murder and terror. The string of ISIL attacks across Europe in 2015 and 2016 further illustrates the global consequences of this technological acceleration. International travel has never been easier or cheaper than it is today, and would-be terrorists, traffickers, launderers, and even assassins can fly nearly undetected from continent to continent, in the sea of traveling humanity. Though it is clear that this connectivity is widespread and threatens global security, the details of the agreements or arrangements between terrorist, insurgent, and transnational criminal organizations remain murky. A partial exception to this is in instances where both organizations wish for new relationships to be known, such as the 1998 merger of Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.8 Other relationships, such as between the FARC and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), are opaque as neither organization has an interest in revealing the relationship. It is unclear in the majority of cases what kinds of partnerships these are, and we are often unable to discern whether such instances of cooperation are one-time affairs or longer-term arrangements. This lack of information handicaps our response and threatens global security. The purposeful opacity of illicit organizations presents a vexing challenge to mapping and understanding these actors. Operating by intention outside the vision of regulators or researchers, their activities and revenues are hidden. So how do we determine the magnitude of their operations, or the harm they inflict? How do we know the value of their transactions? We extrapolate from extremely inexact evidence, such as seizures, arrests, convictions, and the associated testimony of witnesses, often themselves members of such organizations and motivated to dissemble. Analysts still rely on the nearly 20-year-old "International Monetary Fund (IMF) consensus range," of "$1 to $3 trillion" or "two to five percent" of global product. In 1998, Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the IMF, provided that estimate of the amount of money laundered annually across the globe. Given what we know about global trafficking in drugs, persons, weapons, counterfeits, and other contraband it seems unlikely that the value of illicit trade has decreased over the past 20 years. Even at a “mere” two to five percent of global product, Camdessus described the magnitude of the problem as “almost beyond imagination….”9 Less difficult, but still challenging and far more visceral to calculate, is the cost of global terrorism in human lives. At publication, the most recent estimates suggest that 2014 saw an increase of 35 percent in the number of terrorist attacks globally, with total fatalities rising to nearly 33,000 by some counts; 2015 is likely to mark another increase, as ISIL continues its brutal global campaign, and Boko Haram terrorizes the Lake Chad Basin.10 This does not take into account nonfatal injuries, the destruction of families and communities, and the economic costs. These cannot be monetized, but few would deny that the opportunity cost of the "global war on terror" (GWOT) has been huge. A 2008 estimate by Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes put the long-term costs of the Iraq War at $3 trillion. The Cost of War Project puts the total economic cost of America's post-9/11 campaigns at $4.4 trillion through FY 2014.12 These two sets of costs -- the global illicit market plus the costs associated with the GWOT -- comprise a staggering portion of global product, and give a plausible indication of the magnitude of the emerging alternative ecosystem. Consider the drag on global productivity and development if so much of human activity is dedicated to transnational crime and terrorism. Adding to this, the cost of networked insurgencies in countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan, suggests that an unconscionable proportion of global resources is being expended by efforts to undermine the well-being of citizens worldwide. Imagine what might be accomplished for all mankind if those resources were available for more constructive investment. Net Systemic Costs Not only do these networks divert economic resources globally, but they also reduce the capacity of states to govern, rendering them incapable of effectively governing their territory or borders, let alone exercising a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, or providing other vital public services. The net systemic harm is imposed at four levels: the inability of states to govern their populations and territories, which creates seedbeds for international terrorism, networked insurgency, and transnational crime, causing immense human suffering; the regional spillover effect from state fragility and instability, that sometimes penetrates key U.S. allies and partners; the growing feral regions that serve as launch pads for attacks against U.S. national security interests worldwide, as well as potentially direct attacks on the homeland, as occurred on September 11, 2001; and the cost associated with the decline of the global, rule-based system and the shrinking Westphalian domain. A cursory examination of a few key states shows the toll illicit networks take on our national security interests. Though Mexico's death rate has subsided somewhat over the past two years, the wars between the narcotics cartels and state authorities, and between the cartels themselves, are thought to have caused as many as 130,000 deaths between 2007 and 2013, or over 20,000 per year. Mexican cartels today work hand-in-hand with the criminal gangs of Central America's Northern Triangle -- comprised of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala -- resulting in some of the highest homicide rates in the world. El Salvador's official forensic unit estimated the homicide rate in 2014 at nearly 70 per 100,000. Despite their collaborative intentions, these countries are under such duress that their security partnership contributions cannot yet inspire confidence. Indeed, in 2014, nearly 70,000 unaccompanied children from Central America and Mexico made their way through Mexico to the United States to escape the tormented lands of their births. Another key security partner, Nigeria is the most populous African state with the largest economy, and a major oil producer. Nigeria could and should play a stabilizing role throughout the continent. In fact, Nigerian forces were critical in staunching the civil wars that hemorrhaged West Africa in the 1990s through the 2000s. Yet today, Nigeria is hobbled by the burgeoning Boko Haram insurgency in the north, and resurgent gang insurgency in the Niger Delta. Moreover, the Boko Haram scourge has bled into the neighboring countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The once-hopeful suppositions that Iraq and Afghanistan could act as U.S. security partners now seem to be wishful thinking. Despite the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars to bolster the capacity of these two potential partners, effective collaboration seems extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan today struggles to survive the attacks of al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Haqqani networks, and more recently ISIL. Though the Government of Afghanistan welcomes U.S. engagement, its effectiveness as a security partner remains questionable. Similarly, Iraq struggles to survive as an autonomous state, depending on Kurdish and Shia nonstate militias in its fight with ISIL. Afghanistan and Iraq may continue to act as incubators for terrorist groups planning attacks against the United States well into the future. Though the nature or extent of the connections between these terrorist and criminal organizations is not transparent, what is clear is that when they desire to interact, they are able to do so. Joint training, learning, and sharing of experience are certainly likely, if not yet joint operations. While states unwillingly and unwittingly act as safe havens for destabilizing global actors, even more troubling are instances in which there is clear collusion between such groups and elements of sovereign states. For example, Iran's Quds Force, a special forces unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has been both directly engaged in terrorist acts around the world, and is supportive of other terrorist organizations. Ominously, in 2011, an attempt by the Quds Force to collaborate with the Los Zetas cartel to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States was intercepted. That this effort was interdicted by the vigilant DEA is extremely fortunate -- at that particular moment in time, with the combustible tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Sunni and Shia throughout the Islamic world, the consequences of the intended assassination are difficult to imagine. One need only consider the consequences of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo just a century ago to put this into perspective. This effort by the Quds Force to conspire with Los Zetas, now fully documented in U.S. case law, demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the potential collusion of sovereign states and terrorist organizations with criminal organizations. This type of collusion is not limited to the Middle East. As Douglas Farah has written, Venezuela has utilized the state's diplomatic tools to support criminal and terrorist activity. North Korea has long been known as a hub of illicit activity, allegedly including smuggling, counterfeit trade, production of controlled substances, illegal weapons trafficking, and money laundering. Pyongyang's infamous Bureau 39 is thought to generate between $500 million and $1 billion per year from such illicit activities. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2016. 402p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2016 at: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/Beyond%20Convergence/BEYOND%20CONVERGENCE%20%20World%20Without%20Order%20.pdf?ver=2016-10-25-125406-170 Shelf Number: 144992 Keywords: Counterfeit TradeIllicit NetworksISISNational SecurityOrganized CrimeSmugglingTerrorismTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Mayors Against Illegal Guns Title: Inside Straw Purchasing: How Criminals Get Guns Illegally Summary: This report presents findings from an investigation into one of the main ways criminals get guns: Straw purchases (when one person poses as the buyer of a gun that is actually for someone else). The report was prepared by the Mayors Against Illegal Guns based on investigative work by the James Mintz Group. It presents 12 specific findings showing how some licensed gun dealers sell handguns to illegal traffickers through straw purchases - which could and should be prevented. Details: s.l.: Mayors Against Illegal Guns, 2008. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 10, 2016 at: http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/12/inside-straw-purchasing-criminals-get-guns-illegally.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/12/inside-straw-purchasing-criminals-get-guns-illegally.pdf Shelf Number: 146986 Keywords: Gun ControlGun TraffickingGun ViolenceIllegal GunsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Control Arms Campaign Title: The AK-47: the world's favourite killing mahine Summary: Kalashnikov assault rifles are the most widespread military weapons in the world. It is estimated that there are between 50 and 70 million of them spread across the world’s five continents. They are used daily by soldiers, fighters, and gang members to inflict untold suffering in many countries. The spread of these weapons continues largely unchecked by governments, threatening the lives and safety of millions as weapons fall into irresponsible hands. More than ever, the Kalashnikov rifle is the weapon of choice for many armies, militias, armed gangs, law enforcement officials, rebels, and other private actors who abuse fundamental human rights and operate beyond the international humanitarian law parameters laid down by the Geneva Conventions and other relevant international law. Although the United Nations and its member states have taken concrete action to limit the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction through international treaties and monitoring organisations, the number one tool used for killing and injuring civilians today is small arms, including the assault rifle, which is reaching more countries than ever before. On 26 June 2006, the UN Review Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons begins in New York. At this conference, governments have an opportunity to agree effective and comprehensive controls to prevent the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including assault rifles like the AK-47. In October 2006, at the UN General Assembly, governments should agree to negotiate a new global Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to regulate international transfers of all conventional arms, including military assault rifles. Details: s.l.: Control Arms.org: 2006. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Control Arms Briefing Note: Accessed November 21, 2016 at: https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa3/files/ak-47-worlds-favourite-killing-machine.pdf Year: 2006 Country: International URL: https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa3/files/ak-47-worlds-favourite-killing-machine.pdf Shelf Number: 147878 Keywords: Arms ControlAssault WeaponsFirearmsIllegal FirearmsIllicit TradeTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: New York (State). Office of the Attorney General Title: Target on Trafficking: New York Crime Gun Analysis Summary: There are about 11,000 homicides by gun in America annually,[1] and each represents a multifold tragedy: a life-lost, a family destroyed, a community scarred. Beyond the yellow-tape of the crime scene, the bereaved ask "Who did this?" For those committed to stopping gun violence, the next question must be: “Where did they get the gun?” This report begins to provide an answer for guns recovered in New York. The New York State Office of the Attorney General (NYAG) is committed to preventing gun violence across New York State. It does so through its statewide gun buyback programs, defense and enforcement of New York’s gun safety laws, and aggressive disruption of violent gangs and gun trafficking rings by its Organized Crime Task Force (OCTF), which has recovered hundreds of crime guns in recent years.[2] Crime Gun Any gun connected to a crime that is recovered by law enforcement. A “crime gun” is any gun connected to a crime that is recovered by law enforcement. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) can “trace” these guns which, when successful, can begin to answer the question of “where did they get the gun?” While review of a single trace may reveal data that help solve a crime, comprehensive analysis of trace data can detect regional patterns of crime gun movement into and within a state. These patterns can be used to create sound policies and targeted interdiction strategies aimed at combatting trafficking of dangerous firearms. The NYAG created this first-of-its-kind report and interactive Tracing Analytics Platform to better understand gun trafficking patterns and to assess the efficacy of laws in combatting illegal guns in New York State. The Platform further allows local law enforcement to reach their own conclusions about how to address crime guns in their area. While federal appropriations riders known as the Tiahrt Amendments dramatically restrict ATF’s ability to use and distribute trace data, ATF can share such information with local law enforcement and prosecutors. Like ATF, these groups can publish aggregate statistical data regarding firearms trafficking patterns.[3] By collecting and analyzing New York aggregate gun trace data for 2010-2015, NYAG identified regional differences in trafficking patterns while discovering a commonality among crime guns recovered across New York State: New York’s gun laws have curbed access to the guns most associated with violent crimes, handguns. But the ready availability of these guns in states without these protections thwarts New York’s effort to keep its citizens safe. Our analysis has led us to several recommendations, including calling on the federal government to close the so-called “gun show loophole” which allows private sales of firearms without a background check, and urging states to require permits for handguns, which has worked effectively in New York to keep these dangerous guns out of the hands of criminals. Details: Albany: Office of the Attorney General, 2016. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 5, 2016 at: https://targettrafficking.ag.ny.gov/#part1 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://targettrafficking.ag.ny.gov/#part1 Shelf Number: 147886 Keywords: Gun ControlGun ViolenceGun-Related Crime, ViolenceTrafficking in GunsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia Summary: Colombia has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Most of those killings involve firearms. What is the relationship between violence, crime and arms trafficking in Colombia? This report aims to find out. The biggest problem is that in parts of Colombia, the State does not have a monopoly on the use of force. Highly organized criminal structures such as drug trafficking mafias and paramilitary groups are well-armed and dangerous. There are many private security companies, some of which use illegal weapons. Most Colombians who die from bullets do not die through indiscriminate violence. Rather, firearms are being used in the “professional” exercise of violence. The Government therefore has a major challenge to disarm such groups and reduce violence. It also needs to strengthen gun control by increasing penalties for arms trafficking and the illegal carrying of arms. Furthermore it needs to cut the supply of weapons by stopping the illicit trafficking in firearms. As demonstrated in this report, this is a trans-border issue. Weapons and ammunition are being smuggled into Colombia, very often in return for drugs. Regional cooperation and improved border control are essential to cut the links between drug trafficking, organized crime and insurgency. Colombia deserves praise for its regional and international efforts to regulate and control small arms and light weapons. It understands from its bitter experience the need to reduce arms trafficking and that international cooperation, particularly with neighbouring States, is vital. More countriesshould learn from Colombia’s experience. Since 2005 the world has had a powerful instrument against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, namely a Protocol which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Ratification of this protocol is shamefully slow considering the seriousness of the threat posed by illegal weapons. Preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit manufacture and trafficking in firearmsis not an impossible dream. Whereas in the past people have talked about the importance of beating swords into ploughshares, some inspired Colombians are showing the world that you can turn guns into guitars. Colombian musician and peace activist Cesar Lopez has builtseveral "escopetarra" – part rifle (escopeta) and part guitar (guitarra). With more activistslike Mr. Lopez, greater domestic gun control and greater regional and global cooperation, Colombia and the rest of the world will have less guns and more guitars. Details: Bogota: UNODC, 2006. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/Colombia_Dec06_en.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Colombia URL: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/Colombia_Dec06_en.pdf Shelf Number: 144925 Keywords: Drug TraffickingGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesOrganized CrimeTrafficking in WeaponsViolent Crime |
Author: de Tessieres, Savannah Title: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Niger Summary: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Niger—the first in a new series of Briefing Papers — examines the measurement of illicit arms flows in Niger in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 16. Based on field research conducted in Niger, the Briefing Paper maps the national and international bodies that collect data relevant to monitoring the evolution of illicit arms flows in and through Niger. It also discusses the relevance of Indicator 16.4.2 and suggests ways to improve the monitoring of progress towards the achievement of SDG Target 16.4 in Niger, and more widely in Africa. The Paper is the third in a series of four publications on measuring illicit arms flows in selected countries. Key findings: Niger's security forces seize weapons and ammunition and keep useful records. The quality of data collection varies greatly between institutions, however, and a central, national database of seizure-related information is crucially lacking. Though Niger is primarily a transit route for weapons circulating in the region, measuring illicit arms flows in the country is key to understanding the evolution of trafficking trends in the wider region In the absence of comprehensive data on arms seizures in Niger, other indicators should also be used, including the fluctuation in materiel pricing and reports on the use of firearms in acts of violence. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2017. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed March 21, 2017 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP1-Niger.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Niger URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP1-Niger.pdf Shelf Number: 144533 Keywords: Firearms Trafficking Illicit Arms Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Martyniuk, Anton Title: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Ukraine Summary: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Ukraine is the fourth case study in a series examining the measurement of illicit arms flows in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 16. Based on interviews carried out in Kiev in addition to desk research , this analysis outlines the sources of illicit arms flows in Ukraine and the status of government plans or action to counter the problem, the trafficking routes used to smuggle weapons, and key indicators of illicit arms flows in the period 2010-2016. Key findings: Ukrainian civilians possess large numbers of unregistered small arms. The conflict in the east has contributed to significant diversion and losses from national stockpiles and the proliferation of a wider array of weapons types. The conflict and the concomitant increase in insecurity correlate with increased seizures from 2013 to 2014, although efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons have recovered only a modest number of illicit firearms. Ukraine still has no primary law regulating the manufacture, purchase, and possession of firearms and no central state register of civilian-held firearms. This makes it difficult even to differentiate between legal and illegal firearms in the country - and, by extension, complicates efforts to monitor and address illicit arms flows. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2017. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed May 3, 2017 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP3-Ukraine.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Ukraine URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP3-Ukraine.pdf Shelf Number: 145253 Keywords: Firearms Trafficking Illicit Arms Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Jenzen-Jones, N.R. Title: Web Trafficking: Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Libya Summary: The Libyan revolution deposed the Qaddafi regime in 2011, bringing to an end the tight regulation of the domestic arms trade. Military stockpiles were raided, and small arms and light weapons made their way into the hands of non-state armed groups and private sellers. The subsequent conflicts after the fall of the Qaddafi regime have resulted in more weapons flowing into the country. From a virtually non-existent domestic market, the revolution and its aftermath paved the way for a large illicit arms trade. Like their counterparts in many nations, some of the players in this new market now sell their wares via the Internet. Online sales via social media platforms are one of the tools currently being used for this purpose. ARES is delighted to announce that a new Working Paper, authored by ARES Director N.R. Jenzen-Jones & ARES Researcher Ian McCollum, and commissioned by the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey, has been released today. Working Paper 26 Web Trafficking: Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Libya provides an in-depth analysis of the trade in SALW in the online marketplaces of Libya. The Working Paper ties together interviews with marketplace participants with detailed analysis of a dataset derived from long-term monitoring of some of the closed social media-based groups listing small arms and light weapons for sale. It explores the types of weapons offered and their likely routes into the Libyan online markets. It concludes with a policy-relevant analysis of the current state of Libya's online markets and discusses the caveats and utility of such online monitoring for supplementing field-based research. The report indicates there is a "booming online black market" for arms and munitions, according to Director Jenzen-Jones. "It is reasonable to conclude that the online illicit weapons marketplace is growing in terms of both demand and supply," he said. Speaking with the Washington Post, Director Jenzen-Jones noted that "Whilst online trades appear to account for only a small portion of the illicit arms trade in Libya, this method's relative anonymity, low barrier to entry, and distributed nature means it is likely to pose unique challenges to law enforcement and embargo monitoring operations." Whilst companies responsible for some of the social media platforms which have been used for illicit arms trading have taken limited steps to curb the practice, the majority rely on users to report violations. ARES has documented several groups which have been shut down, only to reopen days or even hours later, with a core 'nucleus' of the same members. "It is difficult," Director Jenzen-Jones told the Christian Science Monitor, "to moderate these sellers effectively, due to the fluid nature of the trade." Numerous groups remain active in Libya and elsewhere. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, 2017. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed Mary 4, 2017 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-SANA-WP26-Libya-web-trafficking.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Libya URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-SANA-WP26-Libya-web-trafficking.pdf Shelf Number: 145313 Keywords: Black MarketsIllegal MarketsIllicit tradeOnline TradeSmall Arms SurveyTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Chicago. Office of the Mayor Title: 2017 Gun Trace Report Summary: Since 2013, the Chicago Police Department has recovered nearly 7,000 "crime guns" each year. For the purposes of this report, a crime gun refers to a firearm recovered by CPD that was illegally possessed, used, or suspected to be used in furtherance of a crime. The overwhelming majority of these firearms were originally purchased outside of the city limits and brought into Chicago. So far in 2017, CPD is already on pace to exceed last year's gun recoveries. It is self-evident that the availability of illegally circulated firearms in Chicago is directly connected to its deadly street violence. Simply put, each conflict becomes potentially more lethal due to easy access to a gun. In an unfortunate but persistent reality, certain retailers and jurisdictions disproportionately account for the guns trafficked into Chicago that sustain its illegal gun market and associated violent crime. There is no greater priority for the City of Chicago than the safety and security of its residents. The City of Chicago and Chicago Police Department have partnered with the University of Chicago Crime Lab to examine available firearm trace data and identify the source of each crime gun recovered in order to develop more impactful solutions that address the root causes of gun violence. This is the second such report. In its 2014 report, CPD compiled firearm trace data from 2009 to 2013. This report analyzes available firearm trace data over four years, from 2013 to 2016, spanning almost 15,000 firearms traced back to more than 5,000 federally licensed dealers. Using this data, law enforcement and policymakers have identified the regular sources of crime guns trafficked into Chicago with pinpoint accuracy. More importantly, they are now better equipped to develop policies that will help prevent these guns from getting into the hands of highrisk individuals. Details: Chicago: Office of the Mayor; Chicago Police Department, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 3, 2017 at: https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2017/October/GTR2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2017/October/GTR2017.pdf Shelf Number: 148019 Keywords: Gun Violence Gun-Related Violence Homicides Illegal Guns Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Salcedo-Albaran, Eduardo Title: Firearms Trafficking: Central America Summary: The aim of this paper is to characterize the traffic of firearms across Central America. The document has five sections. The first one is a background of Central American countries that are mainly related to this type of traffic. In the second section, trends related to main sources, hotspots, routes and the actors agents involved in the arms trafficking market in Central America are explained. The third part is a brief presentation of the main restrictions and regulations of firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other materials in the more affected zone by firearms trafficking, the northern triangle: Honduras, Guatemala and Salvador. The fourth part includes relevant cases related to firearms trafficking in the region. The fifth part includes conclusions Details: Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks, 2017; Bogota, Colombia; Vortex Foundation. 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: The Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks - Research Paper No. 17. VORTEX Working Papers No. 31: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_9440bb7922324758ac345f2f72d188ce.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Central America URL: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_9440bb7922324758ac345f2f72d188ce.pdf Shelf Number: 148218 Keywords: Criminal Networks Firearms Trafficking Organized Crime Social Network Analysis Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Salcedo-Albaran, Eduardo Title: Firearms Trafficking: Mexico - United States border Summary: The aim of this paper is to explain the global scale operation of firearms trafficking. The document conveys information about (i) the process of diversion of firearms, (ii) the actors usually involved in the illicit trade of guns, and (iii) the links of firearms trafficking with criminal networks. In the second part of the document these elements are explicit in the exposition of the Mexico-USA border situation of firearms trafficking, currently one of the most relevant hotspots for this criminal activity. Details: Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks, 2017; Bogota, Colombia; Vortex Foundation. 2017. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: The Global Observatory of Transnational Criminal Networks - Research Paper No. 16. VORTEX Working Papers No. 30: Accessed November 17, 2017 at: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_269c0e689dbe438dafd8c0cd460e709d.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/522e46_269c0e689dbe438dafd8c0cd460e709d.pdf Shelf Number: 148219 Keywords: Criminal Networks Firearms Trafficking Organized Crime Social Network Analysis Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Parsons, Chelsea Title: Beyond Our Borders: How Weak U.S. Gun Laws Contribute to Violent Crime Abroad Summary: From the earliest days of his presidential campaign, a constant refrain from Donald Trump has been the need to protect the United States from foreign threats, particularly violent crime that he falsely asserts is committed at high rates by immigrants to this country. The Trump administration's protectionist, isolationist, nativist, and racist immigration policy is founded on the scurrilous notion that the United States needs to close the borders and restrict immigration to the country as a way to protect against the entry of violent crime. However, often overlooked in this debate is the degree to which exportation of violence goes in the other direction-that is to say, from the United States to other countries-and, in particular, the substantial U.S. role in providing guns that are used in lethal violence in other nations. From 2014 to 2016, across 15 countries in North America, Central America, and the Caribbean, 50,133 guns that originated in the United States were recovered as part of criminal investigations. Put another way, during this span, U.S.-sourced guns were used to commit crimes in nearby countries approximately once every 31 minutes. Certainly, many of these U.S.-sourced crime guns were legally exported and were not diverted for criminal use until they crossed the border. The United States is a major manufacturer and a leading exporter of firearms, legally exporting an average of 298,000 guns each year. However, many of the same gaps and weaknesses in U.S. gun laws that contribute to illegal gun trafficking domestically likewise contribute to the illegal trafficking of guns from the United States to nearby nations. This report discusses the scope of the problem of U.S. guns being trafficked abroad and used in the commission of violent crimes in other nations. For example, in 2015, a trafficking ring bought more than 100 guns via straw purchases in the Rio Grande Valley of the United States and smuggled them to Mexico. At least 14 of these firearms were recovered in Mexico. In addition, this report identifies a number of policy solutions that would help to reduce the flow of crime guns abroad and begin to minimize the U.S. role in arming lethal violence in nearby countries. These recommendations include: Instituting universal background checks for gun purchases; Making gun trafficking and straw purchasing federal crimes; Requiring the reporting of multiple sales of long guns; Increasing access to international gun trafficking data; Rejecting efforts that weaken firearm export oversight. The United States has a moral obligation to mitigate its role in arming lethal violence abroad. While there are many factors unique to each nation that affect rates of violent crime, there is more the United States could do to reduce the risks posed by U.S.-sourced guns that cross the border and are used in crime in nearby countries. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2018. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 6, 2018 at: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2018/01/31115010/012918_BeyondOurBorders-report-51.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2018/01/31115010/012918_BeyondOurBorders-report-51.pdf Shelf Number: 148995 Keywords: Gun ControlGun EnforcementGun PolicyGun TraffickingGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Alusala, Nelson Title: Africa in Arms: Taking stock of efforts for improved arms control Summary: The future of Africa's development is intrinsically linked to the continent's ability to take charge of its peace and security. The African Union (AU) Commission is best placed to lead this process. However, the organisation and its member states have continuously been challenged by the widespread and uncontrolled flow of arms and ammunition. The AU Commission and its affiliated sub-regional organisations have put into place a number of initiatives and mechanisms that align their efforts with global processes, but Africa is yet to fully enjoy the dividends of these measures. This paper reviews the achievements attained so far, explores some of the drivers of the demand for arms and identifies recommendations for bolstering existing efforts. Recommendations - To strengthen current efforts, the AU, regional economic communities (RECs) and regional mechanisms (RMs) should consider the following: - Strengthening stockpile management systems within member states. This should include the construction of modern armouries and capacity building for relevant personnel. - Enforcing the implementation of arms embargoes, in collaboration with the UN sanctions committees and embargo monitoring groups. - Addressing terrorism comprehensively. Terrorism is increasingly becoming a major driver for illicit arms flows. There is an urgent need for the AU and its sub-regional organisations to coordinate efforts to eliminate this growing menace. - Regulating artisanal arms manufacturers. These manufacturers should be supported in a framework that allows them to operate in a more formalised way. Failure to do this would exacerbate illicit arms proliferation and manufacturing. Details: s.l.: ENACT, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Paper Issue 3: Accessed February 6, 2018 at: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-12-13-ResearchPaper-AfricainArms-Research.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Africa URL: https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-12-13-ResearchPaper-AfricainArms-Research.pdf Shelf Number: 148998 Keywords: Arms ControlIllegal Trade Illicit WeaponsTerrorism Trafficking in WeaponsWeapons |
Author: Gashaw, Tasew Title: Mitigating Cross-Border Intergroup Conflicts along the Ethiopia-South Sudan Border Summary: The Horn of Africa is afflicted by poor human security, conflict, and terrorism and is one of the most insecure regions in Africa. In addition, international borders in the region are porous, contested, volatile, and fragile. All of these factors heighten conflict among the borderland people in the region. A prime example of border porousness and fragility can be found along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border. These two countries share an 874km (543 miles) open and fragile international border along the Gambella Regional State of Ethiopia. The local people on the border consist of the Murle in South Sudan, the Nuer, the Anyuaa, and other highlander communities on both sides of the border. Details: Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2017. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Program; Policy Brief No. 13: Accessed February 13, 2018 at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/mitigating-cross-border-intergroup-conflicts-along-the-ethiopia-south-sudan-border Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/mitigating-cross-border-intergroup-conflicts-along-the-ethiopia-south-sudan-border Shelf Number: 149122 Keywords: Border Security Illicit Trade Smuggling Terrorism Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Mendel, William Title: SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime Summary: In April 2015, military and civilian personnel from Canada, Mexico, and the United States came together at Colorado Springs, Colorado, for a symposium hosted by U.S. Special Operations Command-North and facilitated by Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). Their task was to examine the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in combating transnational organized crime (TOC). After opening remarks by Rear Admiral Kerry Metz, a U.S. Navy SEAL and SOCNORTH commander, the panelists and plenary participants set to work considering a wide range of issues attending to the TOC threat. Symposium panelists and speakers synthesized the results of their research and panel discussions about TOC, and these are found in the chapters of this report of proceedings, The SOF Role in Combating Transnational Organized Crime. So what is TOC? President Obama in his strategy to counter TOC advances this description: Transnational organized crime refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activities through a pattern of corruption and/or violence, or while protecting their illegal activities through a transnational organizational structure and the exploitation of transnational commerce or communication mechanisms. The United Nations (UN) defines TOC as a: structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences - in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. Douglas Farah, author and veteran analyst of financial crime, armed groups, and TOC, focuses upon TOC as drug trafficking, money laundering, and human trafficking, plus trafficking in weapons of mass destruction. Compiling a complete list of TOC activities is challenging. Details: Miami: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2016. 204p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 27, 2018 at: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/JSOU%20SOF/JSOU16_MendelMcCabe_CTOC_final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/JSOU%20SOF/JSOU16_MendelMcCabe_CTOC_final.pdf Shelf Number: 149593 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Human Trafficking Money Laundering Organized Crime Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Savona, Ernesto U. Title: Fighting Illicit Firearms Trafficking Routes and Actors at European Level: Final Report of Project FIRE Summary: Project FIRE - Fighting Illicit firearms trafficking Routes and actors at European level (www. fireproject.eu) - was carried out with the financial support of the European Commission, DG Home Affairs, within the Prevention of and the Fight against Crime (ISEC) Programme. The research is an exploratory study on the illicit trafficking of firearms (ITF) in the EU. Based on the results obtained, it also provides recommendations on how to improve the fight against and the prevention of ITF. For the purposes of the study, ITF has been defined as every case in which the illicit acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts or ammunition occur from, to, or within the territory of the EU. Background The availability of firearms is recognised as an increasingly pressing issue because of the lethal impact that firearms can have in terms of violence and terrorism. For this reason, the EU is currently revising its Firearms Directive, and the fight against organised crime and terrorism ranks high on the European security agenda. However, the role that ITF plays in feeding into violence within the EU has long been disregarded. This has been mirrored by a lack of priority given to rigorous investigation of the origins of firearms involved in the commission of crimes-and a lack of scientific research in the field. In addition, there is a lack of public official data on ITF. Approach Project FIRE adopts an integrated market perspective to address these difficulties and to study ITF within a wider framework of illicit markets. This approach makes it possible to combine analysis of both the various stages within the illicit supply chain of ITF and the demand for illicit firearms. It develops a methodology based on the collection and analysis of data from online news and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and custom press releases, providing high level of detail and a large number of variables. For this purpose, firearm seizures have been considered as a proxy for the ITF, and deadly and non-deadly shootings as proxies for the demand for illicit firearms. This study represents a first step towards better understanding of the ITF in the EU. It is accordingly an important resource for both public and private institutions and researchers. The results from the project have been grouped into three parts: - ITF in the EU (Part I) - The EU's regulatory framework to counter ITF (Part II) - Recommendations on how to improve the prevention of and fight against ITF (Part III). Details: Milano: Transcrime - Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore 2017. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2018 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FIREFinalReport.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FIREFinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 149749 Keywords: FirearmsFirearms TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in WeaponsWeapons |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives Summary: Objectives -- The objectives of this audit were to evaluate: (1) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) controls over weapons, munitions, and explosives; (2) ATF compliance with policies governing weapons, munitions, and explosives; and (3) the accuracy of ATF's weapons, munitions, and explosives inventories. The audit covers ATF's weapons and munitions inventories, including firearms, Tasers, ammunition, chemical agents, diversionary devices, and explosives, as well as seized weapons, ammunition, and explosives inventories from fiscal years (FY) 2014 through 2017. To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed ATF personnel, evaluated ATF's policies regarding property management, firearms, ammunition, explosives, and diversionary devices. We also reviewed documentation related to firearms that were reported as lost or stolen during the scope of our audit to determine whether ATF took appropriate action. Finally, we assessed compliance with ATF policy and conducted physical inventories at 16 ATF locations. Results in Brief -- We found that ATF generally has strong physical controls over ATF-owned firearms and explosives. We also found that ATF has strong inventory controls over its firearms. However, we identified deficiencies related to munitions tracking, the accuracy of ATF's munitions inventories, and compliance with munitions and explosives policy. We also identified areas where ATF's policies should be strengthened to improve the safeguarding and accountability of ATF-owned and seized weapons and munitions. Recommendations Our report contains 10 recommendations to improve ATF's controls over its ammunition, explosives, less lethal munitions, as well as its seized weapons and ammunition. ATF's response to the draft report appears in Appendix 2 and our analysis of the response, as well as a summary of actions necessary to close the recommendations, appears in Appendix 3 of this report. Details: Washington, DC: OIG, 2018. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 18-21: Accessed April 11, 2018 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/a1821.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/a1821.pdf Shelf Number: 149756 Keywords: Firearms and WeaponsIllegal GunsIllegal WeaponsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe. Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE Summary: Project SAFTE is an international research project, funded by the European Commission, that aims to contribute to the fight against (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe. This research project has demonstrated the existence of various illicit firearms markets in the EU, each with their own specific features and dynamics. The traditionally closed character of these markets has partially eroded in several EU member states in recent years, which has increased the availability of firearms in general, and military-grade firearms in particular, to criminals and to terrorists with criminal connections. To combat this, a comprehensive and proactive approach is needed that consists of improving the intelligence picture on illicit firearms trafficking, upgrading the policy and the regulatory framework on firearms, and optimising operational capacities and cooperation. Background Several terrorist attacks have been carried out with firearms in Europe in recent years, causing the deaths of hundreds of people and injuries to hundreds more. These events demonstrate that terrorists are able to get their hands on various types of firearms, including military-grade firearms. Although the use of firearms to commit terrorist attacks is not a new phenomenon in the EU, Europol recently noted that firearms have become the most prevalent type of weaponry used by terrorists and violent extremists across a range of ideologies. This observation led policy-makers in Europe to develop specific measures to combat terrorist access to firearms. In-depth, evidence-based insight into the firearms acquisition dynamics of terrorists in the EU is limited, however. This is part of the larger problem of the scarcity of reliable data and in-depth research with regard to Europe's illicit firearms markets. Process The goal of Project SAFTE is to improve knowledge regarding (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe and to provide information that can influence policy intended to enhance the fight against this security threat. The Flemish Peace Institute coordinated the project, and carried it out in partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitarie di Perfezionamento Sant'Anna (SSSA). In addition, research teams from Arquebus Solutions, the Small Arms Survey and Bureau Bruinsma contributed extensively to the study. The design of the research project consisted of two phases. In a first phase, specialised research teams conducted qualitative, in-depth studies into illicit firearms markets, terrorist access to these markets and national policies to counter these phenomena in eight EU member states: Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Italy, Romania, the Netherlands and the UK. More than one hundred key national actors were interviewed during this process. The second phase consisted of a systematic and comparative analysis, in which the studies in these countries were supplemented by an explorative mapping of the situation in the other twenty EU member states. In addition, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood (the Balkans, Northern Africa and Ukraine), to address the significant interconnections between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. All these findings were then linked to the EU policy context by, for example, interviews with several key international actors. The research conducted for Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications. The findings of the systematic and comparative analysis are presented in a policyoriented synthesis report, Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe: Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE. A separately edited volume, Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe, publishes the individual country studies, together with the studies on the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa and Ukraine. indings on illicit firearms markets There is no unified illicit firearms market in the EU. Various regional variants of illicit firearms markets can be identified, however, each with distinct characteristics and dynamics. These differences can be attributed to a variety of local elements that shape local demand and supply of illicit firearms and influence the involvement of different actors. Although it is currently impossible to quantitatively estimate the scope of illicit firearms markets in the EU in a credible way, it is clear that most of the firearms that are available on illicit firearms markets are handguns. The presence of military-grade firearms is generally more limited. The easy and cheap access to certain firearms in some countries strongly contributes to illicit firearms trafficking across the EU. Most illicit firearms markets in Europe are driven by criminal demand. Different types of criminals tend to procure, possess and use different types of firearms, and contemporary terrorist networks usually rely on established criminal connections to acquire firearms from these markets. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the illicitly possessed firearms are in the hands of private citizens in several EU member states who have no criminal or terrorist motives. These are individuals who simply possess firearms without holding the necessary permits. Firearms end up in illicit markets in the EU through cross-border smuggling from both outside the EU (mainly from the Western Balkans) and intra-EU trafficking (mainly as a result of differences in national legislation). The most important illicit supply mechanisms for firearms in the EU are cross-border smuggling, change of ownership through theft, the conversion of blank-firing guns, and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. Each EU member state has a different illicit firearms market with its distinct supply mechanisms, however. These different supply mechanisms are characterised by their own dynamics, and present specific policy and law enforcement challenges. Our analyses indicate that supplying firearms to European illicit firearms markets is not very lucrative, and is generally not a primary source of income for those actors involved in trafficking firearms. Another observation is the cyclical nature of supply and demand in these markets. The actors involved in firearms trafficking in the EU have constantly adapted their operating methods in reaction to regional, national and European policy initiatives and law enforcement operations. Traditionally, illicit firearms markets in Europe are closed markets with restricted access for people outside criminal networks, and having the right criminal connections and reputation are crucial factors in this, even in countries with rather high levels of illicit firearms possession. Differences can be observed in the access to illicit firearms, and especially military-grade firearms, and these differences are linked to the criminal hierarchy and the criminal milieu to which the potential buyer belongs. They are also reflected by a price hierarchy for illicit firearms markets that is similar across the EU: the most expensive firearms on the illicit firearms market are generally military-grade firearms such as assault rifles, while the cheapest firearms are generally (converted) blank-firing firearms. The closed character of these markets has been under pressure in recent years, which is linked to the observed growing availability of certain types of firearms. The underlying factors of this erosion are the emergence of the Internet, the crossborder smuggling of military-grade assault rifles into the EU, the conversion of blank-firing guns and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. The increased availability of firearms has contributed to arms races between criminal groups across the EU. This has facilitated the gradual tricklingdown of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU member states, especially in Western Europe. Findings on terrorist access to illicit firearms markets Significant amounts of firearms have been seized from different types of terrorist networks in recent years. These firearms include various models and brands of pistols and revolvers, but also various types of military-grade firearms, such as assault rifles and sub-machine guns. Terrorists who procure firearms generally do so exclusively for carrying out terrorist acts and to defend themselves against law enforcement agencies. Most terrorists seem to have a preference for military-grade firearms, although the observed possession of less-suitable firearms among terrorist networks suggests that not all terrorists have access to a wide range of firearms. Our comparative analysis identified clear distinctions between different types of terrorist networks in the EU in the acquisition, possession and use of firearms. While the traditional separatist groups have developed their own distinct (and context-specific) firearms acquisition patterns, religiously-inspired terrorist networks across the EU generally rely on criminal connections to obtain firearms from local illicit markets. There are no indications of significant firearms flows between the various types of terrorist networks in Europe today and also no indications of recent state-sponsored arms transfers to terrorist groups in the EU. For most of the contemporary terrorist networks operating in Europe, access to local criminal firearms markets is a key element in their firearms acquisition patterns. Through their criminal pasts, contemporary terrorists with criminal antecedents have acquired various skills that can be used in the planning and execution of successful terrorist attacks, including the skills and network needed to acquire weapons more easily. Given the generally closed character of these markets, only terrorists with the right criminal connections can acquire firearms, and in particular military-grade firearms, on illicit firearms markets in the EU. The observed terrorist firearms arsenals therefore generally reflect the specific dynamics of the local criminal firearms market. Individuals without a developed criminal network generally experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms, and are more likely to use an alternative acquisition method, for example the Internet, or to use a different type of weapon. No illicit firearms dealers have been observed who exclusively supply firearms to terrorist networks. There seem to be a number of barriers that inhibit criminals from actively and knowingly supplying weapons for terrorist attacks. Illicit firearms dealers are generally not eager to engage in activities that are not very lucrative, but at the same time involve an increased risk of detection and higher penalties. Terrorists will generally rely on already established criminal connections, often pre-dating their radicalisation, in order to obtain firearms on illicit markets, and sellers often do not know they are selling to terrorists. This can be observed among the significant number of terrorists with a criminal history. Prisons have also been identified as places that offer new opportunities for terrorists who do not yet have the necessary criminal connections to acquire firearms. The overwhelming majority of those perpetrators of recent jihadi terrorist attacks who had a criminal history were involved in low-level criminality. There have been some exceptions of perpetrators who attained a mid-level position in the criminal underworld, but none of the perpetrators or people arrested for plotting terrorist attacks in the EU in recent years was a member of a high-level organised crime group. In countries where illicit firearms supply channels are tightly controlled by a limited number of highly-organised crime groups, it is quite difficult for terrorists to acquire firearms. In particular, countries with more chaotic criminal landscapes present potential terrorists with increased opportunities for illicit firearms acquisition. Individuals who acquire firearms for a terrorist network are generally not recruited for this specific purpose, but are already part of the network, and become responsible for this task later because of their skills and networks. Contemporary terrorist networks seeking (specific types of) firearms, but who lack the necessary criminal connections or are operating in a context of limited firearms availability in the local illicit market, can engage in the direct diversion of legally owned firearms, for example by targeted thefts of firearms from state stockpiles or legal gun owners. From a historical perspective, targeted thefts have been a vital element in the firearms acquisition patterns of separatist terror groups in Europe, but such thefts have decreased in recent years. Firearms that were deliberately stolen have only been encountered among jihadi networks in exceptional cases. The diversion of legal ownership for terrorist aims through various forms of embezzlement is also quite exceptional in the EU, as well as the legal possession of firearms by perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Yet, in some EU member states significant numbers of legally-owned firearms have been observed among members of extremist networks, and especially right-wing networks. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 236p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Shelf Number: 149820 Keywords: Illicit FirearmsTerrorismTerroristsTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Florquin, Nicolas Title: From Legal to Lethal: Converted Firearms in Europe Summary: Firearms conversion is a challenge in all European countries. While the phenomenon may be more visible in countries with the strictest gun laws, ease of access to converted firearms and their cheap prices make them attractive alternatives to lethal-purpose firearms in all corners of Europe. Converted firearms are also challenging to investigate, which reinforces their appeal among criminals. Converted firearms include imitation guns such as alarm weapons and deactivated firearms that have been modified to function as real, lethal-purpose weapons. Basic engineering skills, available workshop space, and commonly used tools are often all that is required to perform some conversions. Petty criminals are generally the primary users of converted alarm weapons, while organized crime groups and terrorist actors have used both reactivated firearms and converted acoustic expansion weapons. There is, however, a growing concern that organized crime and terrorist actors might increasingly resort to converted alarm weapons. Strengthened European Union regulations and coordinated law enforcement operations have succeeded in reducing some specific sources of converted firearms. Yet the efforts of regulators and law enforcement agencies to counter firearms conversions have been mainly reactive. Real-time firearms-related crime intelligence and data sharing are critical to preventing, detecting, and rapidly tackling fluid firearms conversion patterns. In this report, the Small Arms Survey undertakes a detailed examination of the firearms conversion challenge in Europe. More specifically, the report provides a typology of converted firearms, examines the nature and scope of the firearms conversion threat, reviews the mechanics of trafficking in converted firearms, and assesses the European response to this issue. Research for this report drew from consultations and interviews with a broad range of law enforcement actors in Europe, with particular focus on firearms investigators and forensic experts. Details: Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-Report-Europe-Conversion.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-Report-Europe-Conversion.pdf Shelf Number: 149821 Keywords: Illicit Firearms Terrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe Summary: In recent years there has been growing policy attention for illicit firearms markets in Europe. Yet, in-depth research into the scale of the problem as well as the specific characteristics and dynamics of these markets is lacking for most EU member states. This is part of larger problem where firearms and gun violence in the European context have traditionally received scant research attention. To illustrate this, in 2012 Greene and Marsh found that, between 1999 and 2009, 665 Web of Science articles had been written on firearms and violence. Two thirds of these articles, however, covered the situation in the United States (US), and were written primarily by authors based in the US.1 In contrast, research on the situation in Europe continues to be rather sparse. One of the reasons for this difference is that levels of gun crime and gun deaths in Europe are relatively low. A recent study demonstrated that, in the EU, on an annual basis an average of 1,000 homicides are committed with a firearm.2 As such, firearms-related homicides in Europe are among the lowest in the world.3 In addition, large-scale illicit firearms trafficking is quite exceptional in the EU and the illicit firearms market is considered to be modest in size. Nevertheless, the lack of a sound understanding of illicit firearms markets in Europe is not only an epistemological problem. It has obvious and far-reaching policy implications. Specifically, it hampers attempts to develop and implement a comprehensive regulatory and operational approach to combat illicit firearms markets and terrorist access to these markets. The EU has repeatedly stated that building a better intelligence picture on this multifaceted security phenomenon is urgently needed. Recent terrorist attacks involving firearms in Europe significantly boosted the sense of urgency. Both at national and EU levels various legislative and policy initiatives have been undertaken to reinforce the fight against illicit firearms trafficking in general, and to prevent terrorist firearms acquisition in particular. Yet, due to the lack of sound research, these initiatives have often been based on a case-bound, partial or even completely lacking, meaningful intelligence pictures. A mature research community could contribute significantly to the intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking that is being developed by national law enforcement agencies and Europol. Yet, a European research community focused on illicit firearms trafficking and gun violence in Europe is currently still germinal. In their extensive literature review Greene and Marsh identified two distinct research mainly relied on in-depth interviews with key national actors involved in the combat against illicit firearms trafficking or terrorism. During the initial phase of the research, it became clear that the phenomena under consideration could not be adequately understood without a sounder understanding of what happened in Europe's wider neighbourhood. Therefore, in addition to the eight country studies, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood in order to address the significant nexus between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. Overview of the chapters The research conducted within the framework of Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications: a policy report and a comprehensive research volume. The policy report10 contains the systematic and comparative analysis of the main findings of the different country and neighbourhood studies, whereas this research volume contains all eight in-depth country studies and two neighbourhood studies as separate chapters. This allows the reader to gain profounder and more detailed insight into the research findings of Project SAFTE. The first chapter of this book examines the illicit gun market in Belgium, a country often labelled as one of Europe's hotspots for illicit firearms trade. In this chapter Nils Duquet and Kevin Goris argue that the illicit gun market in Belgium is largely driven by criminal demand, especially from drugs criminals, armed robbers and organized motorcycle gangs. In recent years an increase in converted blank firing weapons and reactivated firearms has been observed. The availability of these weapons eroded the traditional closed character of this market. This made it easier for both lower-ranking criminals and terrorists with criminal connections to acquire firearms. The authors warn that current heightened prioritisation of terrorism in Belgium has become a double-edged sword in the fight against illicit firearms trafficking: while it has increased policy attention for this security phenomenon, it has also brought about a (temporary) displacement of people and resources towards preventing and investigating terrorism. Duquet and Goris conclude that Belgian law enforcement services all too often treat terrorism and illicit firearms trafficking as two distinct problems. They strongly recommend better information sharing and the development of joint actions between and within the law enforcement services that combat these interconnected security phenomena. In the second chapter Filip Dragovic, Paul James, Kresimir Mamic and Robert Mikac analyse the illicit firearms market in Croatia. Despite large number of weapons handed in during voluntary surrender programmes, the current illicit firearms market in Croatia is still largely based on the significant presence of weapons left over from the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, including large quantities of military grade firearms. A great number of these legacy weapons ended up in the hands of civilians. The authors note that alongside these legacy weapons, firearms have also entered the illicit market through illicit production and thefts. Small storage facilities at police stations and lower-level military units in particular, remain prone to theft. Interestingly, the authors argue that, despite the widespread illegal firearms possession in the country, Croatia is not characterized by a very active illicit firearms market because many of the illegal gun owners prefer to retain their firearms. They conclude that research on the Croatian illicit firearms market is still limited and stress the need for more cooperation between law enforcement agencies, judicial bodies, the private sector and the research community to improve the current intelligence picture and enhance the combat against illicit firearms trafficking. In the third chapter of this book Lina Grip demonstrates that the illicit gun market in Denmark is fragmented and supply-driven. Criminal gangs, both organized motorcycle gangs as well as less organized urban street gangs, are the main customers on the illicit firearms market in Denmark. Violent conflicts between such groups are responsible for most of the public shootings in the country. A majority of firearms on this market are locally sourced, especially through thefts of old unregistered firearms. Grip warns that shooting clubs are commonly being used by criminals to practice their shooting skills and as a target for thefts. She also stresses the role played by gun enthusiasts, without violent or criminal intentions, who act outside of the law and this way may feed the illicit market. Not surprisingly, the firearms used in recent terrorist attacks in Denmark were acquired through thefts. While Danish policy to combat illicit firearms possession has been primarily focused on deterring the use of firearms by criminal gangs, Grip concludes that more can be done to integrate firearms-specific initiatives into programmes to prevent violent extremism. In the fourth chapter Nicolas Florquin and Andre Desmarais present a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the illicit firearms market in France and the firearms possessed and used by different terrorist groups in recent years. They argue that France has a sizeable and growing pool of illicit firearms as a result of a historic tolerance towards unregistered rifles and shotguns, and because of cross-border smuggling of firearms in recent decades. This chapter demonstrates that the firearms on the French illicit market originate from a wide variety of sources and that terrorist groups have used a wide range of procurement methods to access firearms. Florquin and Desmarais demonstrate that different types of terrorist groups and networks are characterized by different firearms acquisition patterns. While jihadi terrorist networks have used their, mainly low-level, criminal connections to procure firearms, a terrorist group like ETA, for example, has instead relied heavily on targeted thefts. Tracing firearms often proves very difficult, but the authors stress the merits of doing so. The tracing of the reactivated rifles used in recent terrorist attacks, for example, has been a crucial step in building momentum to politically address the problem of easy-to-reactivate weapons from Slovakia. The illicit firearms market in Italy and terrorist access to this market is the focus of the fifth chapter. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni note that the Italian market has mainly been supplied with a wide variety of firearms from the Western Balkans since the 1990s, but that organised crime groups have also relied on firearms thefts and the reactivation of firearms. The authors stress that terrorist access to this market is rather difficult because the supply channels are tightly controlled by Italian organised criminal groups, who believe that it is not in their best interest to sell firearms to terrorist networks. In the sixth chapter Monique Bruinsma and Toine Spapens provide an overview of the main features of the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands as well as an in depth analysis of terrorist access to this market and Dutch policies that have been developed to tackle this access. This chapter demonstrates the increased availability and criminal use of military-grade assault rifles in the country in recent years. This has partly been a result of trafficking of easy-to-reactivate firearms from Slovakia. Not only criminals, but also terrorists have been able to access the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands. In recent years the Dutch police have arrested at least fifteen terror suspects for the illegal possession or (attempted) acquisition of firearms. An in-depth analysis indicates that a broad range of firearms have been seized in these cases and demonstrates a firearms acquisition pattern for terrorists in which (usually pre-existing) criminal connections are crucial. The seventh chapter contains the first ever in-depth study on the illicit firearms market in Romania. Roxana Albisteanu, Alexandru Dena and Matthew Lewis note that researching this topic in Romania is hindered by the lack of uniform data collection and registration procedures on illicit firearms possession or use by the different law enforcement and other government agencies involved. Despite this caveat, the authors clearly demonstrate the detrimental effects of national legal loopholes on regional illicit firearms markets: the significant availability of easy-toconvert blank firing firearms in Romania is directly connected to the situation in Bulgaria, where these weapons can be bought legally for low prices and where controls can easily be bypassed. This has resulted in significant cross-border smuggling of these weapons into Romania where they are sold to Romanian criminals across the country and in various criminal contexts. While there are no known recent cases of terrorist acquisition of firearms in the country, the authors warn that some of the firearms that are currently legally exported from Romania and EU member states to third countries might eventually end up on criminal markets in the EU, where they can be bought by local terrorists. In the eighth chapter Paul Holtom, Paul James and Connor Patmore analyse terrorist access to the illicit firearms market in the United Kingdom (UK). The authors demonstrate that the combination of a restrictive legislative framework for legal firearms possession, a proactive operational 'investigate the gun' - approach to combat illicit possession and use of firearms, and the use of tough prison sentences as a deterrent, has had a positive influence on the illicit firearms markets in the UK. The firearms that circulate in the UK's criminal underground are therefore very often converted blank firing weapons and antique handguns rather than more heavy duty variants seen elsewhere. The recent cases of terrorist possession of firearms suggest that the access of jihadi and right-wing terrorists to the illicit firearms market is likewise quite restricted. These terrorists' options are largely restricted to converted or antique firearms. They do not usually have access to the semi-automatic or automatic firearms that have been used in terrorist attacks in other parts of the EU. The findings of this chapter, however, indicate that the situation in Northern Ireland differs significantly, with Republican splinter groups having retained a wide range of legacy weapons from the 'Troubles', including different types of military-grade firearms, and continuing to use them in politically motivated attacks. The illicit proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa is the focus of the ninth chapter of this book. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni argue that in recent years illicit firearms possession has increased significantly in several Northern African countries as a direct result of the volatile political and security situation in the region. In particular the fall of the Libyan dictator Qaddafi in 2011 and the armed violence that has ravaged the country afterwards has significantly increased illicit arms trafficking. A vast regional black market in firearms has emerged which has reached various groups from the western Sahel to the Middle East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit firearms possession, the authors demonstrate that criminal activities and the recent episodes of armed violence in the country have significantly exacerbated opportunities for state stockpile captures and arms transfers to different non-state actors. While most of the firearms trafficking is currently contained within the state borders of Ukraine, the authors warn that there are signs that this will likely change when the armed conflict stabilizes and the internal demand for these weapons decreases. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 484p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Shelf Number: 149844 Keywords: FirearmsGun MarketsIllicit Firearms Smuggling of FirearmsTerrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Mehlbaum, Shanna Title: Notoire straten: Over de lokale inbedding van georganiseerde criminaliteit Summary: Although not always visible, some (shopping) streets in the Netherlands appear to be the scene for all kinds of organized crime, such as drug trafficking, money laundering and illegal gambling. These notorious streets act as criminal meeting places and offer all kinds of facilitating services. A combination of factors means that these streets offer a relatively anonymous and safe environment for shadowy practices. This is shown by research by Mehlbaum Research commissioned by Police and Science. Everyone probably knows the places in his or her place of residence where there is suspicion of activities that do not tolerate the light of day. Such 'notorious streets' are central to this research. In order to gain insight into exactly what is happening at such locations, the researchers have looked at this for a long time in three such streets. The focus was on locally embedded forms of crime and possibilities to better visualize them. For the investigation, both police investigation and enforcement information were analyzed and expert sessions and interviews were held with community police officers, detectives, municipal officials, residents and entrepreneurs. The research shows that various forms of organized crime occur in the areas. This concerns drug crime, illegal gambling, illegal prostitution, liquidations and firearm incidents. In addition to these criminal activities, there is also an atmosphere of intimidation and threat in the streets. This concerns, among other things, the roadblocking of entrepreneurs, claiming parking space and actual threat. There may be several people involved in crime in the street: entrepreneurs, employees, residents, visitors, house owners, brokers and tenants. In every street, another type is most strongly represented. These infamous streets often fall between shore and ship in their approach. The criminal investigation department does not work in a sufficiently area-oriented manner and neighborhood teams have no view of crime behind the faade. The problem is persistent and residents and entrepreneurs have often lost confidence in the government to turn the tide. This improvement is a long-term process and requires joint efforts from, among others, criminal investigation, district police, local authorities and special investigative services. The research report includes indicators that can help professionals in the streets to recognize locally embedded organized crime. (Google Translation) Details: Apeldoorn: Politie & Wetenschap, 2018. 176p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 26, 2018 at: https://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/cache/files/5b32828d11a66PK92.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Netherlands URL: https://www.politieenwetenschap.nl/cache/files/5b32828d11a66PK92.pdf Shelf Number: 150710 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Illegal Gambling Money Laundering Organized Crime Place and Crime Prostitution Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Anders, Holger Title: Monitoring Illicit Arms Flows: The Role of UN Peacekeeping Operations Summary: The illicit flow of arms and ammunition contributes to destabilizing countries in which UN PKOs operate. Understanding such flows is a prerequisite for effective countermeasures. UN PKOs are uniquely placed to assist in the identification and monitoring of these flows; in some cases, PKOs also have legal obligations to take certain actions to counter diversion. At the same time, few PKOs take advantage of their potential capacity to monitor illicit arms flows. This appears to be mainly due to a lack of awareness and understanding of the requirements of PKOs. In turn, this leaves unused an important tool that is available for identifying and eventually countering illicit arms flows. This Briefing Paper first looks at the mandates of UN PKOs and at why missions and the troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs and PCCs) that take part in them can make a significant contribution to the monitoring of illicit arms flows. The paper then highlights the relevant experiences of two UN PKOs with extensive experience in this field: Coote d'Ivoire and Mali. It concludes with a discussion of lessons learned and challenges faced. Details: Small Arms Survey, 2018. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed August 22, 2018 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SANA-BP-Monitoring-Illicit-Arms-Flows-PKOs.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SANA-BP-Monitoring-Illicit-Arms-Flows-PKOs.pdf Shelf Number: 151237 Keywords: Illicit Weapons Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Strategic Applications International Title: Below Ten: Combating Drugs, Guns, and Human Trafficking at the U.S. Southwest Border Summary: The Below Ten project focused on three cities located on or below Interstate 10 - (1) Nogales, Arizona; (2) Pharr, Texas; and (3) San Diego, California - and their efforts to respond to a wide range of problems related to guns, drugs, and human trafficking. A key component of the project was the series of summits held to develop stakeholder-led plans to respond to the wide range of humanitarian, commercial, and enforcement issues. This publication describes the outcomes of these summits, which brought community members together with local, state, federal, and tribal law enforcement; public health providers; social services; and other groups to identify problems, challenges, and solutions. It also provides detailed information on the approach adopted by each community and the activities that have been sustained since the project ended. Details: Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2018. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2018 at: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p369-pub.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p369-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 151604 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingGun TraffickingHuman TraffickingTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Paoli, Giacomo Persi Title: The Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons on the Dark Web: A Study Summary: The potential role of the dark web in facilitating trade in firearms, ammunition and explosives has gained increased public attention following recent terrorist attacks and other criminal activities worldwide. In fact, the hidden and obscured parts of the web are used by criminals and others to access a worldwide market where it's possible to procure or sell a wide range of weapons and associated products through encrypted marketplaces and vendor shops. Following the outcomes of the Third United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which acknowledged the importance of considering new challenges and opportunities arising from new forms of illicit trafficking, this Occasional Paper summarises the main findings and implications of the first empirical study investigating the scale and scope of arms trafficking on the dark web. The findings of this study shed light on the scale and scope of arms trafficking on the dark web, illustrating the range of weapons traded, their market price and most common transit routes. In addition, this Occasional Paper discusses the implications of this growing phenomenon for law enforcement agencies and policy makers, highlighting the key role that firearms control measures continue to play in the presence of new forms of trafficking. Details: New York?: UNODA, 2018. 107p. Source: Internet Resource: UNODA Occasional Papers No. 32: Accessed November 3, 2018 at: https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/occasional-paper-32.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/occasional-paper-32.pdf Shelf Number: 153252 Keywords: Cybercrime Dark Web Illegal Markets Illicit Trade Organized Crime Terrorism Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Small Arms Survey Title: Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa Summary: In the first-ever continental analysis of illicit arms flows in Africa, the African Union Commission and the Small Arms Survey identify the scale, availability, characteristics, and supply patterns of illicit small arms in Africa. The African Union (AU) Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by Year 2020 was adopted in January 2017 and sets out practical steps to address the underlying drivers of conflict as well as the tools and enablers of violence. Preventing the illicit flows of weapons within Africa, including to conflict zones, is a vital component of the AU Roadmap, and this report aims to provide AU member states with a synthesis of relevant information on the topic. Weapons Compass: Mapping Illicit Small Arms Flows in Africa finds that cross-border trafficking by land is the most prominent type of illicit arms flow affecting countries on the continent. The weapons trafficked comprise both those sourced from within the continent - such as legacy weapons recycled from earlier conflicts and weapons diverted from national stockpiles - as well as arms sourced from other parts of the world, including embargo-breaking transfers from the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The report provides practical recommendations for AU member states to tackle illicit arms flows by noting specific assessments that can be generated to fill knowledge gaps; practical guidance and tools to develop; and ways in which to support and coordinate the implementation of those recommended actions. Details: Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2019. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 25, 2019 at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SAS-AU-Weapons-Compass.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Africa URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/weapons-compass-mapping-illicit-small-arms-flows-africa-enarpt-january-2019 Shelf Number: 157055 Keywords: Firearms Trafficking Illicit Arms Illicit Trade Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |